政策性银行贷款合约的决定  

Research on Loan Contracting of Policy Banks

作　　者：李广子[1,2] 陈醒 LI Guangzi;CHEN Xin(Institute of Finance and Banking,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100028,China;Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 102488,China)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院金融研究所 [2]中国社会科学院国家金融与发展实验室 [3]中国社会科学院研究生院

出　　处：《金融评论》2020年第4期16-28,123,共14页Chinese Review of Financial Studies

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(编号:18BJY250)的阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：政策性银行是我国银行体系的重要组成部分,但有关政策性银行的微观研究还非常少。基于手工收集的2000-2016年上市公司政策性银行逐笔贷款合约数据,本文考察了政策性银行贷款合约受哪些因素影响。研究发现政策性银行在制定贷款合约过程中不完全遵循商业性标准。本文还发现,当借款人为国有企业、受到产业政策支持或者货币政策宽松时,政策性银行贷款合约的贷款条件会更加优惠。本文的研究为理解政策性银行的贷款行为提供了微观证据。Although policy banks are an important part of China s banking system,studies on policy banks from micro perspectives are relatively few.Based on a manually collected dataset of loan contracts of policy banks for listed firms from 2000 to 2016,this paper examines what determines loan contracts of policy banks.It finds that loan contracting of policy banks doesn t fully satisfy the commercial principle.This paper also finds that,loan contracting of policy banks is more favorable for the borrowers that are SOEs or supported by industrial policy or when the monetary policy is relatively loose.This study provides micro-evidence for understanding the lending behavior of policy banks.

关 键 词：政策性银行 贷款合约 货币政策 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学]