基于质量投入激励的复杂装备供应链决策研究  

Research into Decision Making of Complex Equipment Supply Chain Based on Quality Input Incentive

作　　者：杨倩 程永波[1] YANG Qian;CHENG Yong-bo(School of Management Science and Engineering,Nanjing University of Finance and Economics,Nanjing 210023,China)

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学管理科学与工程学院,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《南京工程学院学报（自然科学版）》2020年第4期49-57,共9页Journal of Nanjing Institute of Technology(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71573115,71774072);江苏省社会科学基金重点项目(17GLA005);江苏高校哲学社会科学重大项目(2017ZDAXM010);江苏省研究生科研与创新项目(KYCX19_1341)。

摘　　要：在由主制造商主导的复杂装备主制造商—供应商供应链中,考虑主制造商对供应商的不同激励策略,以及产品的质量和价格对市场需求的影响,建立由主制造商先确定激励契约,供应商再围绕零部件定价或质量投入选择不同决策顺序的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究不同激励策略下供应商不同决策顺序的最优质量投入与定价决策问题.通过不同情形下的均衡解研究,探讨不同激励契约与决策顺序下供应链主体的最优决策以及决策对供应链主体期望收益的影响机制.通过案例以及参数的敏感性分析,验证模型方法的科学性与有效性,为复杂装备供应链中各主体提高零部件与产品质量及绩效提供了管理依据.As to the supply chain of complex equipment“main manufacturer-suppliers”dominated by main manufacturers,this paper takes account of different incentive strategies by main manufacturers,and influences of quality and prices of products on market demands.A model is built for stackelberg games,in which incentive contracts are first determined by main manufacturers and then suppliers decide pricing or quality of the order of different decision.What is mainly studied in this paper are a supplier s different optimal quality and pricing decision-making sequence under different incentive strategies.The optimal decision of the supply chain subject under different incentive contracts and decision sequence and the influence mechanism of the decision on the expected return of the main body of the supply chain are discussed through equilibrium solution of different cases.Finally,through the sensitivity analysis of cases and parameters,the scientific nature and effectiveness of the model method are verified,which provides a management basis for the improvement of parts and product quality and performance of each subject in the complex equipment supply chain.

关 键 词：复杂装备 质量投入 定价决策 决策顺序 激励策略 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]