创新导向团队薪酬及其契约设计的实验研究  

An Experimental Study on Innovation-oriented Team Compensation and Its Contract Design

作　　者：石琦 肖淑芳[3] 陈茜 Shi Qi;Xiao Shufang;Chen Qian

机构地区：[1]中国东方资产管理股份有限公司博士后科研工作站 [2]中国人民大学博士后科研流动站 [3]北京理工大学管理与经济学院 [4]中国人民银行营业管理部

出　　处：《统计研究》2020年第12期46-57,共12页Statistical Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“权益薪酬契约对企业创新的影响机理与实证检验”(71672010)。

摘　　要：团队合作是现代企业创新活动的主要工作方式,团队薪酬的模式选择与契约设计对于企业创新具有重要意义。本文设计了一项奶茶店团队经营实验,采用实验研究的方法检验不同模式下团队薪酬对创新绩效的影响,以及团队薪酬中探索性薪酬的授予范围和业绩考核强度对创新绩效的影响。结果表明:与固定薪酬和浮动薪酬相比,探索性薪酬模式下实验团队的创新投入水平更高、创新产出更多;对于授予范围来说,与不授予探索性薪酬、较小范围授予探索性薪酬及全部授予探索性薪酬模式相比,较大范围授予探索性薪酬时实验团队的创新投入水平更高、创新产出更多;对于业绩考核强度来说,与宽松型业绩考核强度和严格型业绩考核强度相比,适中型业绩考核强度下实验团队的创新投入水平更高、创新产出更多;团队的风险规避程度同样影响创新绩效,探索性薪酬模式下风险偏好的团队普遍有更好的创新投入表现。本文的研究丰富了团队薪酬及其契约设计与创新绩效的相关文献,为企业设计创新导向的团队薪酬契约提供了理论依据。Teamwork is a prevalent pattern of corporate innovation,and the choice and design of team compensation have great significance in corporate innovation.This paper designs a milk-tea shop management experiment and uses the experimental study method to test the influence of different team compensation contract,granting proportion and performance assessment intensity of exploration salary on innovation performance.The results show that:1)compared with the fixed salary and the floating salary,the teams paid by exploration salary have higher innovation inputs and outputs.2)In the aspect of granting proportion,compared with no exploration salary,small proportion of exploration salary and exploration salary for all,teams paid in large proportion of the exploration salary have higher innovation inputs and outputs.3)In the aspect of performance assessment,compared with loose and strict performance assessment,teams with moderate performance assessment have higher innovation inputs and outputs.4)The risk aversion of teams also affects the innovation performance,and risk-preferring teams paid by exploration salary usually have higher innovation inputs.This research enriches relevant literature on team compensation,contract design and innovation performance,and provides a theoretical basis for innovation-oriented team compensation design.

关 键 词：团队薪酬 创新绩效 契约设计 实验研究 

分 类 号：C812[社会学—统计学]