“双积分”政策下新能源内外车企“畸形嫁接”防范机制  

‘Abnormal Grafting’prevention mechanism of domestic and foreign new energy auto enterprises under the dual-credit policy

作　　者：郭本海 王涵[2] 李文鹣[2] GUO Benhai;WANG Han;LI Wenjian(College of Economics and Management,China Jiliang University,Hangzhou Zhejiang 310018,China;School of Management,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang Jiangsu 212013,China)

机构地区：[1]中国计量大学经济与管理学院,浙江杭州310018 [2]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2020年第11期109-118,共10页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“基于超冲突均衡的技术密集型产业递阶式技术突破及其驱动机制研究”(批准号:71673119);“新产品开发多团队系统中领导的效能机制研究-交互记忆系统为中介”(批准号:71601171);教育部人文社会科学基金项目“双积分政策下新能源汽车产业发展的”政策悖论“信号识别及防范机制研究”(批准号:18YJA630056)。

摘　　要：双积分政策以新能源汽车积分为重要抓手,利用积分配额和积分交易从供给侧倒逼国内车企扩大新能源汽车生产。该政策在有效推动我国新能源汽车市场发展的同时,催生了一些不良现象,其中之一便是国内外车企“畸形嫁接”,即国内弱势车企为了套换积分过政策关的短期目标而放弃长远利益,甘于接受国际汽车巨头的合资、收购要约,在发展核心技术及实现产业控制上无所作为,易使产业发展的话语权旁落。针对双积分政策冲击下新能源内外车企“畸形嫁接”现象,在构建政府、国外汽车巨头和本土弱势车企的多方博弈模型基础上,引入贝叶斯后验概率,分析我国新能源汽车内外车企合作过程中各方主体间的损益关系及其策略选择趋向稳定点的条件,利用MATLAB模拟仿真重要参数变化对系统稳定性的影响。研究表明,政府对国内外车企策略选择的后验概率与预判的先验概率成正相关;本土弱势车企额外的努力成本、政府强干预的额外支出、股权分配比例、政府审批监督的概率等,均能显著影响系统均衡稳定的结果,其中中外合资股比在50%~60%最佳。为了防范“畸形嫁接”、抢占新一轮汽车产业的制高点,可考虑从政企合力推进新能源汽车技术标准体系建设、科学合理放开股比结构以及强化关键技术创新能力、重塑自身品牌价值等方面着手,以减少对国外汽车巨头的依赖;充分利用国外知名车企品牌价值迁移与领先技术溢出,寻找恰当的合作模式,提升能源汽车产业发展的内涵。The dual-credit policy takes new energy vehicle credits as an important indicator to force domestic vehicle enterprises to expand the production of new energy vehicles from the supply side by using credit quota and credit trading.On the one hand,the policy effectively promotes the development of new energy vehicle market in China.One the other hand,it also brings some undesirable phenomena.One of the defects is‘abnormal grafting’of domestic and foreign vehicle enterprises,which means domestic vulnerable vehicle enterprises give up long-term interests in order to achieve the short-term goal of passing the policy.Therefore,these local enterprises are more willing to accept the joint venture and acquisition offer of international auto companies than to develop core technology and realize industrial control by their own.In this circumstances,it is easy to lose the discourse power of local enterprise development.In order to explore and avoid the phenomenon of‘abnormal grafting’of domestic new energy vehicle enterprises under the impact of double points policy,the multi game model of government,foreign auto giants and local weak auto enterprises combines with Bayesian posterior probability is built.The game model is introduced to analyze the relationship of profit and loss between the domestic and foreign auto enterprises of new energy vehicles in China and the conditions for the stable point of strategy selection.Moreover,MATLAB is introduced to simulate the influence of important parameter changes on system stability.The results show that the posterior probability of government's strategy choice for domestic and foreign auto enterprises is positively correlated with the prior probability of prediction.The extra effort cost of local disadvantaged auto companies,the extra expenditure of strong government intervention,the proportion of equity allocation,the probability of government approval and supervision,etc.,can significantly affect the system’s balanced and stable results.Besides that,the research shows t

关 键 词：新能源汽车 双积分政策 畸形嫁接 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]