独立设计师品牌“预售+寄售”供应链微分博弈模型  

Differential Game Model of Independent Designer Brand“Pre-order+Consignment”Supply Chain

作　　者：张科静[1] 周媛媛[1] ZHANG Kejing;ZHOU Yuanyuan(Glorious Sun School of Business and Management,Donghua University,Shanghai 200051,China)

机构地区：[1]东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海200051

出　　处：《东华大学学报（自然科学版）》2020年第6期985-992,共8页Journal of Donghua University(Natural Science)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(12YJA630185)。

摘　　要：构建了一个由独立设计师品牌和两个买手店(分别采用预售和寄售合作形式)组成的二级时尚供应链模型,应用微分博弈理论,考虑时尚指数及努力水平对需求的影响,研究三方的最优决策问题。研究发现:商誉和时尚指数衰退越快,设计师和买手店的利润越低;随着品牌成长系数的提高,品牌利润显著提升;买手店价格竞争越剧烈,服务水平越高,供应链利润越高。用数值算例验证了模型的有效性,研究结果可为设计师及买手店的决策提供参考。This paper proposed a two-level fashion supply chain model including an independent designer brand and two buyers stores(pre-order and consignment).The optimal decision of three parties was studied by considering the influence of fashion index and effort level on demand based on the theory of differential game.The results indicate that the faster the good-will and fashion index decline,the lower the profits of designers and buyers.As the increase of brand growth coefficient,the brand profit increases significantly.And the service level and supply chain profits increase with the increase of price competition.The validity of the model is verified with numerical examples,and the results of the study can provide a reference for the decision making of designers and buyers.

关 键 词：微分博弈 独立设计师品牌 供应链 买手店 时尚指数 品牌成长系数 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]