标准专利许可中保护与反垄断的价格协调机制研究  

Price Coordination Mechanism Between Protection and Antimonopoly in Standard Patent Licensing

作　　者：岳贤平 YUE Xianping(Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815)

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学商学院,南京211815

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2020年第12期41-54,共14页Research on Economics and Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目“标准专利许可中保护与反垄断的冲突及协调机制研究”(17AJY001)。

摘　　要：本文通过构建经济数学模型,对同质产品条件下的标准专利许可中的保护与反垄断的固定价格、可变价格和两部收费制等三类价格协调机制的内在机理进行了分析。主要结论包括:三种价格形式在市场均衡条件下具有不同的均衡特点,体现出技术标准许可的相关主体的不同利益诉求;固定价格和可变价格比率都随着技术标准使用者的数量的增加而降低;可变价格比率和均衡产量负相关;在完全和对称信息条件下,技术标准所有者更偏好于单一的固定价格和单一的可变价格。本文的分析结论丰富了相关理论研究,不仅得到了MPEG的相关技术标准许可的典型案例的部分支持,也对技术标准的相关主体具有很好的政策性启示作用。By building the economic mathematical model,this paper analyses the internal mechanism of three kinds of price coordination mechanisms,i.e.fixed fees,royalties and two-part fees,for protection and anti-monopoly within the standard patent licensing under the condition of homogeneous products.The main conclusions are shown as follows.Firstly,the three price forms have different market equilibrium characteristics,which reflects different demands of relevant subjects of standard patent licensing.Secondly,both fixed fees and the royalty ratio decrease with the increase of the number of technology standard users;the royalty ratio decreases with the increase of equilibrium quantity.Thirdly,under the condition of complete and symmetric information,the owner of technical standards prefers a single fixed fee and a single royalty.The conclusion of this paper enriches the relevant theoretical research,not only supported by some typical cases of the licensing of relevant technology standards of MPEG,but also has some good policy implications for the relevant subjects of technology standards.

关 键 词：知识产权管理 技术标准 标准专利许可 反垄断 价格机制 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理] F49[经济管理—国民经济]