博弈论视角下政府采购参与主体行为分析  

The analysis of the behavior of participants in government procurement from the perspective of game theory

作　　者：何雪锋[1] 薛霞 李艳秋 何伟 HE Xuefeng;XUE Xia;LI Yanqiu;HE Wei(Accounting School,Chongqing University of Technology,Chongqing 400520,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆理工大学会计学院,重庆400520

出　　处：《重庆理工大学学报（社会科学）》2020年第12期55-63,共9页Journal of Chongqing University of Technology（Social Science）

基　　金：重庆市研究生创新项目“大智移云下以‘管资本’为核心的国有资产监督管理研究”(CYS20355)。

摘　　要：随着经济发展的不断进步,我国政府采购规模日益扩充,政府采购工作方兴未艾,同时也滋生了譬如“天价采购”“政府采购潜规则”“指定中标”等不容忽视的政府采购问题。基于博弈论方法,构建关于采购方、供应商合谋行为与管理监督机构监管力度大小的策略选择模型,讨论参与主体在理性选择下的随机组合情况,再进行了不同情形下的局部稳定性分析,得出影响参与政府采购主体做出最终策略的主要参数。为了打破诸类“合谋”乱象,首先应对“合谋”多边主体打出“组合拳”惩处措施,其次力争缩减管理监督机构管理监督所付成本,最后应继续优化政府采购程序中具体的制度设计。With the continuous progress of economic development,the scale of our country’s government procurement is expanding increasingly,and the work of government procurement is in the ascendant.But at the same time,some government procurement problems such as,sky-high price procurement,potential rules of government procurement and designated bid winner is arising,which cannot be ignored.Based on the method of game theory,this paper constructs a strategy selection model about the collusion behavior of purchasers and suppliers and the supervision strength of management and supervision institutions,then discusses the random combination of participants under the rational choice,and then analyzes the local stability under different situations,obtains the main parameters that affect the participants in government procurement to make the final strategy.In order to avoid collusion behavior,the punishment should set up to parties of collusion behavior,the supervisory cost should be minimized to the management supervisory organs,and the system of government procurement should upgraded.

关 键 词：政府采购 合谋 均衡博弈 雅可比矩阵 

分 类 号：F253.2[经济管理—国民经济] F224.32