超额商誉、高管激励与审计收费  

Excess Goodwill, Executive Incentive and Audit Fees

作　　者：赵彦锋[1] ZHAO Yanfeng(School of E-commerce and Logistics Management,Henan University of Economics and Law,Zhengzhou,Henan 450046,China)

机构地区：[1]河南财经政法大学电子商务学院,河南郑州450046

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2021年第1期62-69,共8页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(19AGL011);河南省哲学社会科学规划项目(2020BJJ008)。

摘　　要：基于2011-2018年沪深A股上市公司样本,实证检验超额商誉对审计收费的影响以及高管激励的调节效应。研究表明:超额商誉提高了审计收费,且在民营企业更显著;而高管不同激励方式对超额商誉与审计收费的调节具有异质性:股权激励具有抑制作用,而薪酬激励具有增强效应;从作用机制来看,超额商誉通过增加经营风险和审计投入,进而提高审计收费。Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2018 as samples,this paper empirically tests the impact of excess goodwill on audit fees.The findings are as follows:the excess goodwill increases audit fees and this effect is more significant in private enterprises;different executive incentive methods have different adjustment directions for the relationship between excess goodwill and audit fees:the equity incentive has inhibitory effect,while the compensation incentive has enhancement effect;from the perspective of mechanism,excess goodwill increases operational risk,and auditors need to increase input,which further affects audit fees.

关 键 词：超额商誉 经营风险 审计投入 高管激励 审计收费 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]