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作 者:夏德建[1,2] 王勇[1,2] 段玉兰[1,2] XIA Dejian;WANG Yong;DUAN Yulan(School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China;Key Laboratory of Modern Logistics of Chongqing,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China)
机构地区:[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆大学现代物流重庆市重点实验室,重庆400044
出 处:《管理工程学报》2021年第1期142-150,共9页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基 金:国家自然科学基金项目(71672015);中央高校基本科研业务费专项项目(2017CDJSK02PT09)。
摘 要:在竞争环境下,考虑两个开放型电商平台寡头主导的电商服务链,两平台对网商的收费制度为注册收费制、交易收费制、两部收费制等三种收费制度构成的策略集,本文构建了两平台的六种收费制度组合模型。通过博弈论逆序求解法和划线法分析发现:当平台的注册服务成本不低于交易服务成本时,两平台对网商的收费制度选择博弈不一定存在均衡,存在则必为其中一方采取交易收费制而另一方采取两部收费制这种分离均衡;反之,两平台对网商的收费制度选择博弈必定存在均衡,且为双方均选择注册收费制这种混同均衡。E-commerce has greatly reduced the business burden of commercial transaction.Compared with the buyer,the price elasticity of the demand for platform fees by online seller is smaller.Therefore,the e-commerce platform generally adopts a discriminatory pricing strategy that only charge the online seller.However,in the case of fierce competition in multiple e-commerce platforms and the single homing of the online seller,the pricing of the e-commerce platform to the online seller will affect the enthusiasm of them to enter the platform and carry out transaction,thereby affecting the price of the commodity and the demand of the buyer.Ultimately,it affects the market share and revenue of the platform.Therefore,in a competitive environment,it is necessary to consider the third-party e-commerce platform charges the online seller.The article assumes that there are two e-commerce platforms,their tactical set of charging modes for the online seller is{registration charging mode,transaction charging mode,two-part tariff charging mode}.We construct six competitive modes between the two platforms,which are both platforms choose the registration fee charging mode,both platforms choose the transaction fee charging mode,both platforms choose the two-part tariff charging mode,one chooses the registration charging mode and the other chooses the transaction charging mode,one chooses the registration charging mode and the other chooses the two-part tariff charging mode,one chooses the transaction charging mode and the other chooses the two-part tariff charging mode.Firstly,in the assumptions section,based on the Hotelling model,the paper assumes that the registration service cost and transaction service cost of the platform are considered as exogenous variables,both the online seller and the buyer are single homing,the commodity demand is linearly negatively correlated with the commodity price of the platform itself,but linearly positively correlated with the commodity price and charges of the competitive platform.Through the indiffer
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