高管激励对企业创新影响的实证分析——基于分析师关注的中介效应研究  

The Impact of Executive Incentive on Corporate Innovation:A Mediating Effect Study Based on Analyst Attention

作　　者：俞静[1] 蔡雯 Yu Jing;Cai Wen(School of Business,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100)

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,南京211100

出　　处：《技术经济》2021年第1期20-29,共10页Journal of Technology Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金“贝叶斯框架下半参数门限模型的估计、检验及其应用”(71703030)。

摘　　要：基于2011—2018年A股上市公司的面板数据,采用中介效应模型和Bootstrap检验,实证分析了高管激励、分析师关注和企业创新三者之间的关系。结果表明:薪酬激励、股权激励都可以促进企业创新,高管激励力度越大,企业的创新投入和创新产出越多;高管激励与分析师关注呈正相关关系,不论是薪酬激励还是股权激励,都会提高分析师对企业的关注程度;分析师关注在高管激励与企业创新关系中发挥了重要中介作用,高管激励通过提高分析师关注进而促进了企业创新,在控制了高管激励因素后,分析师关注对企业创新仍然存在明显正效应。Based on the panel data of A‑share listed companies from 2011 to 2018,the relationship among executive incentive,analyst attention,and corporate innovation through intermediary effect model and Bootstrap test is explored.It is found that both salary incentive and equity incentive can promote corporate innovation.The greater the incentive for executives,the more innovation input and output the company has.There is a positive correlation between executive incentive and analyst attention,both compensation incentive and equity incentive will increase analyst attention.Analyst attention has played an important intermediary role in the relationship between executive incentive and corporate innovation.Executive incentive promotes corporate innovation by increasing analyst attention.After controlling the executive incentive factor,the analyst attention still has a significant positive effect on corporate innovation.

关 键 词：高管激励 分析师关注 企业创新 中介效应 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]