国有企业承诺升级机制与防范——经验证据与动态贝叶斯博弈  

Escalation and Prevention of Commitment Mechanism of State-owned Enterprises——Empirical Evidence and Dynamic Bayesian Game

作　　者：万为众 WAN Wei-zhong(Department of Economics,University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 102488,China)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院大学财经系,北京102488

出　　处：《财经理论研究》2021年第1期102-112,共11页Journal of Finance and Economics Theory

摘　　要：新中国成立以来,国有企业为我国的经济建设做出了不可磨灭的贡献。但随着经济的发展和历史的变迁,中国社会的主要矛盾也发生了变化。一些国有企业出现的各种问题越来越受到重视,关于国有企业改革的话题也提上了新高度。承诺升级是现代组织管理中的重要现象,但现有研究多集中于微型组织。本文通过对中国冶金行业上市公司2010—2017年的财务数据进行双重差分回归分析,找到了国有企业承诺升级现象的经验证据;采用不完全信息动态博弈模型探讨了政府和国有企业在补贴问题上的策略关系,对国有企业承诺升级的机制给出了规范解释,并对防范亏损国有企业承诺升级的问题提出数点建议。Since the founding of new China, state-owned enterprises have made important contributions to the economy. With the development of the economy and the evolution of history, however, the main contradiction of Chinese society has also changed. Some state-owned enterprises(SOEs) have drawn more attention due to various problems, and the topic of SOE reform has also been raised to a new height. Escalation of commitment is a crucial problem in modern organizational management, However, most of the existing studies focus on micro organizations. In this paper, the financial data of listed companies in China’s metallurgical industry from 2010 to 2017 were analyzed by difference-in-differences(DID) and the empirical evidence of SOEs’ escalation of commitment was found out. The strategic relations between the government and the SOEs on the issue of subsidies with the incomplete information dynamic game model were discussed, and a normative explanation for the mechanism of the SOEs’ escalation of commitment was provided. Finally, several suggestions were put forward for the prevention of SOEs’ problems in escalation of commitment.

关 键 词：国有企业 承诺升级 经验证据 不完全信息动态博弈 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理]