破解双重囚徒困境难题:博弈论视角下国有企业选人用人的机制转变  

Solving the Double Prisoners’Dilemma Problem--Major Changes of Managers Selection and Appointment in SOEs from the Perspective of Game Theory

作　　者：彭鹏[1] 易定红[1] PENG Peng;Yi Ding-hong(School of Labor and Human Resources,Renmin University of China,Beijing,100872)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学劳动人事学院,北京100872

出　　处：《中国劳动》2020年第6期68-80,共13页China Labor

摘　　要：本文应用博弈论和信息经济学的研究方法,对国有企业内部选拔晋升的过程进行了描述,通过分析发现其中存在的问题具有典型的经济学特征,即不同委托人之间以及不同代理人之间在选拔晋升博弈中出现了双重囚徒困境难题。本文通过理论分析发现:党中央在十八大以后通过在选人用人和国有企业党的建设等方面做出的一系列重大措施,改变了委托人的组成结构、偏好结构以及博弈参与人的收益结构,初步破解了国有企业内部选人用人双重囚徒困境难题,实现了选人用人机制的优化。This article uses the methods of Game Theory and Information Economics to describe the process of selection and promotion within SOEs,and through the analysis,it finds that some issues feature typically economics,that is between different principals and agents in the selection and promotion game there is the double Prisoners’Dilemma problem.Through the theoretical analysis,this article finds that since the 18 th National Congress of the CPC,the CPC has issued a series of major measures in terms of personnel selection and the SOEs Party building,which effectively changed the structure of the principals,the preference structure and income structure of game players.It also preliminarily solves the double Prisoners’Dilemma problem in the SOEs,and has achieved a notable optimization of the mechanism in which mangers are selected and appointed.

关 键 词：选人用人 囚徒困境 晋升博弈 委托-代理 

分 类 号：F241.2[经济管理—劳动经济]