考虑强势零售商压价和投资行为的供应链协调  

Channel Coordination in the Presence of Power Retailer’s Price Squeeze and Investment Behaviors

作　　者：冯晓静 FENG Xiaojing(Antai College of Economics&Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China)

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《上海管理科学》2021年第1期7-11,共5页Shanghai Management Science

摘　　要：中国流通产业的零供矛盾日益凸显,针对强势零售商的压价问题构建博弈模型并分析其对供应链协调的影响。在由单制造商和单零售商构成的二级供应链中,考虑零售商在主导产品零售价格的同时,通过增加广告投入或提高服务水平等市场投资措施刺激产品需求,探讨当零售商运用其较强的议价能力对制造商提出的批发价进行强制压价时,双方如何通过合作博弈寻找最佳策略。发现在一定的条件下,强势零售商的压价行为不仅可以提升品牌商誉,更能帮助实现供应链协调。We build a game-theoretical model to capture the power retailers’price squeeze behavior and analyze its effects on supply chain coordination,under the context of increasing contradiction between suppliers and retailers in China’s circulation industry.In a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer,the retailer not only determines the retailing price but also makes investments in the market,such as increasing the advertisement or improving the service level,to stimulate the demand.We discuss how both parties involved will obtain optimal decision strategies through the cooperative game,given that that retailer leverages her strong bargaining power to squeeze the wholesale price proposed by the manufacturer.We find that,under some conditions,such a supply chain can be coordinated and the brand goodwill will be promoted.

关 键 词：定价 供应链协调 强势零售商 博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]