斯特劳森对康德主体概念的批评  

Peter Strawson on Kant’s Conceptions of Subject

作　　者：梁议众[1] LIANG Yizhong(Institute of Philosophy,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院哲学研究所

出　　处：《当代中国价值观研究》2020年第3期15-28,共14页Chinese Journal of Contemporary Values

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“康德心灵哲学研究”(17BZX074)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：斯特劳森对康德主体概念的批评影响深远,他认为康德的先验主体和经验主体概念都存在问题。先验自我意识是经验自我归属的可能性的基本条件,但是康德未能指出经验自我意识的可能性的完备条件。康德没有明确看到经验主体同一性的经验标准和经验主体概念的关系,没有形成一个可应用的关于主体的经验概念。在先验唯心论的形而上学中,康德无法可理解地说明经验主体和超感性主体之间的关系,也无法说明理性与经验主体的关系。康德先验论的主体概念瓦解了经验主体在自然世界中的图景,因此是不可接受的。This paper analyzes Strawson’s criticism of Kant’s conceptions of subject.Strawson believes that Kant’s conceptions of transcendental subject and empirical subject are both problematic.Transcendental self-consciousness is the basic condition for the possibility of empirical self-ascription,but Kant has not stated the full conditions for the possibility of empirical self-consciousness.Kant did not clearly recognize the relationship between the empirically applicable criteria of identity of a subject of experience and the empirical concept of a subject,and did not form an adequate empirical concept of a subject.In the metaphysics of transcendental idealism,Kant cannot explain the relationship between an empirical subject and a supersensible subject,nor the relationship between reason and an empirical subject.Kant’s concept of transcendental subject destroys the picture of the empirical subject in the natural world,and is therefore unacceptable.

关 键 词：主体 自我意识 认识论 形而上学 

分 类 号：B017[哲学宗教—哲学理论]