大股东代理与盈余管理关系研究  

Study on the relationship between major shareholders and earnings management

作　　者：徐攀 Xu Pan(School of Mamagement Science and Engineering,Nanjing University of Finance&Economics,Nanjing,Jiangsu,210023)

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学管理科学与工程学院,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《市场周刊》2021年第2期103-106,共4页Market Weekly

摘　　要：在上市公司中,公司治理问题愈发突出,大股东代理的现象也更加凸显。为了更好地发展,企业将越来越多的精力投入优化股权结构中。因此,为解决企业股权结构不合理、大股东代理现象严重和盈余管理普遍的问题,论文将从第一大股东持股比例、第一大股东性质和股权制衡度三个方面,探讨股权结构对盈余管理的影响,旨在减少大股东的盈余管理行为对中小股东的影响,并给出相应的政策与建议。In listed companies,corporate governance issues have become more prominent,and the phenomenon of major shareholders'agency has become more prominent.For better development,companies are putting more and more energy into optimizing the ownership structure.Therefore,in order to solve the problems of irrational corporate ownership structure,serious agency phenomenon of major shareholders,and widespread earnings management,this article will discuss the effects of ownership structure from three aspects:the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder,the nature of the largest shareholder,and the degree of equity balance.The impact of earnings management aims to reduce the impact of major shareholders'earnings management behaviors on small and medium shareholders,and provide corresponding policies and recommendations.

关 键 词：盈余管理 可操控性应计利润 大股东性质 股权制衡 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济]