上市公司独立董事能够抑制盈余管理行为吗?  

Can Independent Directors of Listed Companies Curb Earnings Management Behavior?

作　　者：杨金磊[1] 杨位留[1] 顾甜甜[1] YANG Jin-lei;YANG Wei-liu;GU Tian-tian(School of Economics and Management,Zaozhuang University,Zaozhuang,Shandong 277160)

机构地区：[1]枣庄学院经济与管理学院,山东枣庄277160

出　　处：《商学研究》2021年第1期105-118,共14页Commercial Science Research

基　　金：国家民委民族研究项目“乡村振兴视角下民族地区民营企业发展现状、问题及对策研究”(2019-GMD-037)。

摘　　要：上市公司独立董事的治理被认为在预防公司内部人为控制经营状况,以及提升公司治理效率方面具有重要现实意义。为验证上述假设,文中选取2007—2017年沪深A股上市公司年度数据,从独立董事比例和任职地点两个维度,研究独立董事的独立性与公司盈余管理的关系,并尝试解读在不同盈余管理动机下,独立董事治理对公司盈余管理行为的影响。研究发现,独立董事的独立性能够抑制公司的盈余管理行为。特别是,提高独立董事比例和增加本地任职,能够明显抑制公司的盈余管理行为,但独立董事比例偏低和异地任职的增多则能够增强公司的盈余管理行为。通过扩展分析发现,即便在较强盈余动机下,独立董事的独立性仍能抑制公司的盈余管理行为。The governance of independent directors of listed companies is considered to have important practical significance in preventing artificial control of operating conditions within the company and improving the efficiency of corporate governance.To verify the above hypothesis,the paper selects the annual data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017,studies the relationship between the independence of independent directors and the company’s earnings management in the two dimensions of the proportion of independent directors and the location of employment,and tries to interpret the influence of independent directors’governance on the company’s earnings management behavior under different earnings management motivations.The study finds that the independence of independent directors can curb the company’s earnings management behavior.In particular,increasing the proportion of independent directors and increasing local positions can significantly curb the company’s earnings management behavior,but low proportion of independent directors and the increase in positions in different places can enhance the company’s earnings management behavior.Through extended analysis,it is found that even with strong earnings motivation,the governance of independent directors can still curb the company’s earnings management behavior.

关 键 词：独立董事比例 异地任职 盈余管理 盈余动机 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F276.6[经济管理—国民经济]