高管变更对股价崩盘风险的影响  

Impact of Executive Turnover on Risk of Stock Price Crash

作　　者：赵保国[1] 王琨 ZHAO Bao-guo;WANG Kun(School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China)

机构地区：[1]北京邮电大学经济管理学院,北京100876

出　　处：《北京邮电大学学报（社会科学版）》2021年第1期80-89,共10页Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition)

摘　　要：以2011至2017年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,对高管变更与股价崩盘风险之间的关系进行实证检验。研究表明:在不区分变更类型的情况下,高管变更将会引起股价崩盘风险降低;而区分变更类型后发现,高管的正常变更将会引起股价崩盘风险降低,强制变更将会引起股价崩盘风险提高。进一步地,由于国有企业和非国有企业高管任命的方式、目的等不同,将样本划分为国有企业样本和非国有企业样本后分别进行检验,发现上述结论与非国有企业的情况相符,而国有企业发生的强制变更与股价崩盘风险之间的关系并不显著。对高管变更的含义进行了解读,为投资人提供了分析高管变更事件的新视角,以期为深入理解高管变更的含义、降低股价崩盘风险提供有益借鉴。Taking China's A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2017 as research samples,the relationship between executive turnover and the risk of stock price crash is empirically tested.The results show that without distinguishing the turnover type,the executive turnover will reduce the risk of stock price crash,but after distinguishing the turnover type,the normal executive turnover will reduce the risk of stock price crash while the forced turnover will increase the risk of stock price crash.Furthermore,due to the different ways and purposes of executive appointment in state-owned enterprises and private enterprises,the samples are divided into the state-owned enterprise group and the private enterprise group and tested respectively.It is found that private enterprises are still in line with the above conclusions,while the relationship between forced turnover in state-owned enterprises and the risk of stock price crash is not significant.The meaning of listed companies executive turnover is explained to provide investors a new perspective of analysis.This has practical significance to understanding the meaning of executive turnover and reducing the risk of stock price crash.

关 键 词：高管变更 股价崩盘风险 国有企业 委托代理机制 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理] F832.5[经济管理—国民经济]