考虑企业社会责任的三级供应链协调策略研究  

Channel Coordination of Socially Responsible Three-Echelon Supply Chains

作　　者：李莉英 龙超 LI Li-ying;LONG Chao(College of Mathematics and Statistics,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China;School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学数学与统计学院,重庆400074 [2]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2021年第2期8-19,共12页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

摘　　要：为考察企业社会责任(CSR)对供应链绩效的影响,将消费者剩余作为企业参与社会责任活动的利润函数,研究了由单个制造商、单个分销商和单个零售商组成的三级供应链的协调优化问题.考虑两种情况:一种情况是零售商参与CSR活动,另一种情况是制造商参与CSR活动.研究表明,在制造商是斯坦克尔伯格(Stackelberg)博弈主导者的情况下,跨级收益共享(SRS)合同能够解决渠道冲突,实现整个供应链的协调,并取得多方共赢的结果;如果制造商过于看重CSR活动,则他的纯利润可能是负的.最后,数值算例验证了有关结果.To study the effect of corporate social responsibility(CSR)on supply chain performance,the coordination issue of a three-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer,a distributer and a retailer is investigated.It is assumed that a firm’s CSR is accounted through consumer surplus of its stakeholders.Two cases are considered:the manufacturer exhibits CSR in one case and the retailer shows CSR in the other.Our analysis shows that,in manufacturer-Stackelberg game setting,a spanning revenue sharing(SRS)contract can achieve supply chain coordination and lead to a win-win situation for channel members;the manufacturer’s pure profit is negative if it puts heavy weight on CSR.Finally,numerical examples are used to illustrate the related results.

关 键 词：企业社会责任 供应链协调 跨级收益共享合同 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F270[经济管理—国民经济]