“忙碌”独董与企业违规  

“Busy”Independent Directors and Corporate Violations

作　　者：江新峰[1] 张敦力[2] 李欢 Jiang Xinfeng

机构地区：[1]华中农业大学经济管理学院,430070 [2]中南财经政法大学会计学院,430073

出　　处：《会计研究》2020年第9期85-104,共20页Accounting Research

基　　金：财政部“会计名家培养工程”;教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(18YJC630058);中央高校基本科研业务费专项基金项目(2662017QD022)的支持。

摘　　要：近年来,独立董事兼任现象十分普遍,然而关于身兼数职的"忙碌"独董履职效果的探讨尚未形成一致结论。为考察"忙碌"独董的履职效果及其背后的逻辑,本文选择企业违规这一情境进行研究。结果表明:"忙碌"独董的存在会降低企业违规行为发生的可能及频率,并且随着企业聘用"忙碌"独董数量以及"忙碌"独董在董事会中占比的增加,该现象更加显著。进一步分析结果表明,"忙碌"独董的"忙碌"程度与其出席董事会会议的次数呈现显著正相关关系,同时"忙碌"独董与企业违规之间的负向关联在年轻"忙碌"独董任职公司、高声誉公司以及整体薪酬激励强度较大的公司中更为明显。本文研究内容进一步打开了兼职独董履职效果的黑匣,从企业违规视角透视出"忙碌"独董基于个人声誉维护动机而勤勉履职的内在逻辑,并为利益相关者抑制企业违规提供了新的思路。In recent years,multiple directorships of independent directors are common.However,the research on the performance of"busy"independent directors has not yet reached a consensus conclusion.This paper selects the situation of corporate violations for research.The results show that"busy"independent directors reduce the possibility and frequency of violations.Further analysis shows that the"busyness"of"busy"independent directors do show a significant positive correlation with their board meeting attended frequency and the negative correlation between"busy"independent directors and corporate violations is more obvious in the companies with young"busy"independent directors,in the companies of good fame and in the companies with relatively high salary incentives for all"busy"independent directors.This paper grasps the essence of the internal logic of the diligent performance of "busy"independent directors based on their personal reputation maintenance motivation and provides new approaches for stakeholders to suppress corporate violations.

关 键 词：独立董事 多席位 企业违规 声誉维护 精力分配 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]