考虑两种激励机制的物流服务网络均衡策略  

Equilibrium Decision of Logistics Service Network Considering Two Incentive Mechanisms

作　　者：张玉圳 赵京彪 周岩 ZHANG Yu-zhen;ZHAO Jing-biao;ZHOU Yan(School of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China)

机构地区：[1]青岛大学商学院,青岛266071

出　　处：《青岛大学学报（自然科学版）》2021年第1期105-112,共8页Journal of Qingdao University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(批准号:71901129)资助。

摘　　要：在研究多个物流企业和物流园区构成的物流服务网络的基础上,考虑两种激励机制鼓励企业履约,构建Stackelberg博弈模型,得到上层物流企业和下层物流园区效益/利润最大均衡策略,并分析两种激励机制对各决策者效益/利润的影响。研究结果表明:激励机制可提高物流企业的履约水平,随着物流企业履约系数增加,企业决策变量服务交易量和服务水平都会增加,履约水平与上下层决策者效益/利润正相关。可见良好的激励机制不仅激励企业履约增加决策者间的信任,而且提高了服务网络整体效益。Two incentive mechanisms in the service network composed of multiple logistics enterprises and logistics parks to encourage enterprises'fulfillment are studied in this paper.The Stackelberg game model is constructed to get the equilibrium decisions considering the largest utilities/profits for logistics enterprises and logistics parks,and the impact of two incentive mechanisms on utilities/profits are also analyzed.The results show that the incentive mechanisms can improve the fulfillment level of logistics enterprises.The service transaction volume and the service level of enterprises increase with the performance level of logistics enterprises,and the performance level is positively correlated with the utilities/profits of the decision makers of the upper and lower layers.It can be seen that the incentive mechanisms not only improve enterprises fulfillment level to increase the trust of decision makers,but also improve the overall benefit of the logistics service network.

关 键 词：服务网络 激励机制 STACKELBERG博弈 履约 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]