国际投资协定中的国有企业条款:美欧模式演变与比较  

SOE Provisions in IIAs:Evolution and Comparison of U.S.and European Styles

作　　者：张斌[1] ZHANG Bin(不详)

机构地区：[1]东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海200051

出　　处：《国际商务研究》2021年第2期79-89,共11页International Business Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“国有企业竞争中立政策研究”(项目编号:16BGJ003)。

摘　　要：本文基于美式和欧式代表性双边投资协定和范本,对投资者定义、东道国义务承担主体、非歧视义务例外和国有企业特殊条款作纵向历史考察和横向比较分析,试图探究国际投资协定中的国有企业竞争中立问题。研究发现,在投资者定义上,两类协定均包含国有企业与私有企业,原则上给予两者同等待遇;在东道国义务承担主体上,美式与欧式协定的差异在于前者明确要求行使监管、行政或其他政府职权的国有企业在一定范围内承担政府义务;在东道国非歧视义务上,美式与欧式协定的差异在于前者一方面通过不符措施条款将政府和国有企业补贴纳入例外,另一方面一度制定国有企业"竞争平等"条款。《里斯本条约》生效后,联盟代表成员国缔结的国际投资协定在上述国有企业权利和义务相关条款上与美式协定的区别正在缩小。Based on the model bilateral investment treaties(BITs)and typical international investment agreements(IIAs)of the U.S.and European styles,this paper analyzes state-owned-enterprise(SOE)-related provisions from both historical and horizontal perspectives to investigate the SOE competitive neutrality obligations in IIAs.The conclusions are as follows.In terms of the definition of"investor",both cover state-owned and private enterprises,thereby offering equal treatment in principle.However,in U.S.IIAs,additional obligations apply to SOEs.In terms of the subject of a contracting party’s obligations,the U.S.IIAs cover SOEs exercising delegated regulatory,administrative or other governmental authority.In terms of MFN obligations,the U.S.IIAs definitely exclude government subsidies or grants on the one hand,while formulate SOE competitive equality provisions on the other.Since the European Commission replaced EU members to negotiate IIAs after the Lisbon Treaty,the European-style IIAs have gradually followed the U.S.model and the above differences are shrinking.

关 键 词：国有企业 国际投资协定 范本 

分 类 号：D996.4[政治法律—经济法学]