家政企业诚信监管的三方演化博弈及仿真分析  

A Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Integrity Supervision of Home Economics Enterprises

作　　者：王丛漫[1] 马骞 WANG Congman;MA Qian(School of Economics and Management,Hebei University of Science and Technology,Shijiazhuang 050018,China)

机构地区：[1]河北科技大学经济与管理学院,河北石家庄050018

出　　处：《经济与管理》2021年第2期84-92,共9页Economy and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71772056);河北科技大学研究生创新资助项目。

摘　　要：随着社会的发展,家政服务进入城市中的千家万户。以政府、家政企业和消费者为研究对象,从诚信监管角度出发,在考虑信息不对称与有限理性条件下,通过构建政府、家政企业和消费者三者之间的演化博弈模型,分析影响不同主体策略选择的主要因素发现:(1)政府监督的概率随着名誉收益、家政企业罚金、社会损失的增大而提高;随着监督成本的增大而降低。(2)家政企业诚信经营的概率随着家政企业的赔偿金、罚金的增大而提高;随着家政企业诚信经营的成本与“失信经营的成本及名誉损失之和”差距的增大而降低。(3)消费者投诉的概率随着得到的赔偿金的增多而提高;随着投诉成本的增大而降低。With the development of society,household service has entered every household in the city.The development of the household service industry has brought a lot of convenience to the public,but the integrity of household service enterprises has also attracted more and more attention.Article from the perspective of domestic enterprise credit regulation,under the condition of considering the information asymmetry and bounded rationality,construction of the government,domestic to the evolutionary game model between enterprises and consumers,analyzing the main factors influencing the strategy choice different subjects,at last,through Matlab simulation analysis,and put forward corresponding countermeasures,to guarantee in meeting the demands of the public housekeeping service at the same time,the combination of the three parties can make better decisions.

关 键 词：政府 家政企业 消费者 诚信 博弈论 

分 类 号：F279[经济管理—企业管理]