管理层权力与企业创新——兼论分析师关注的调节作用  

Management Power and Enterprise Innovation--Also on the Moderating Role of Analysts’Concerns

作　　者：魏霞菲 Wei Xiafei(Nanjing University of Finance and Economics,Nanjing 210023,Jiangsu)

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《江苏商论》2021年第3期118-120,126,共4页Jiangsu Commercial Forum

基　　金：江苏省研究生科研与实践创新计划项目(项目编号:KYCX19_1423)。

摘　　要：当前,新产品、新技术频繁涌现,抢占市场份额,行业竞争不断加剧,企业要想在激烈的环境中生存下来,创新便成为重要的一环。企业创新水平越高,竞争力越强。进一步研究发现,分析师关注强化了管理层权力对企业创新的正向促进作用。研究结论对于企业适当放权以及加强分析师等市场中介队伍的建设进而提升创新水平具有重要借鉴意义。At present,new products and new technologies frequently emerge to seize market shares,and industry competition continues to intensify.If enterprises want to survive in a fierce environment,innovation has become an important part.The higher the level of enterprise innovation,the stronger the competitiveness.Further research found that analysts’attention has strengthened the positive role of management’s power in promoting corporate innovation.The research conclusions have important reference significance for enterprises to appropriately delegate authority and strengthen the construction of market intermediary teams such as analysts to improve the level of innovation.

关 键 词：管理权力 分析师关注 企业创新 

分 类 号：F279.23[经济管理—企业管理]