“优化”还是“恶化”——基于上市家族企业的控制权安排研究  

“Optimization”or“Deterioration”——Research on the Control Rights Arrangement Based on Listed Family Firms

作　　者：麦木蓉 魏安平 钟子康 Murong Mai;Anpin Wei;Zikang Zhong(Guanghua School of Management,Peking University;International school of Business and Finance,Sun Yat-sen University;IBD,China Securities Co.,Ltd)

机构地区：[1]北京大学光华管理学院 [2]中山大学国际金融学院 [3]中信建投证券股份有限公司投资银行部

出　　处：《经济学报》2020年第4期21-63,共43页China Journal of Economics

摘　　要：股票市场的波动挑动着众多的非专业投资者敏感的神经,过度的波动会打击投资者的信心,股价崩盘风险更是悬在投资者心上的一把利刃。家族企业在上市公司中的比重日益增长,与众不同的控制权安排是否带来更高/更低的股价崩盘风险?基于此,本文利用2008年至2017年中国A股非金融上市公司作为研究样本进行分析,结果表明,与非家族企业相比,创始人家族对上市公司进行控制并不是一种有效的控制权安排,家族参与治理程度越高,股价崩盘风险越高。具体表现为,家族大股东对其他中小股东的侵害加剧了股价崩盘风险;进一步发现,在股权制衡水平较低和信息披露质量较低的上市公司中,该效应更加显著。本文的结论在考虑了可能的内生性问题和稳健性检验后依然稳健。本文丰富了家族企业对股价崩盘风险的探讨,对于加强监管、强化信息披露、防范股价崩盘风险有着重要的实践意义。Fluctuations in the stock market have nerved many sensitive unprofessional investors in Chinese market. Excessive fluctuations will adversely impact investors’ confidence, for stock crash risk is a sharp blade on investors’ hearts. Nowadays, family businesses have become an important part of listed companies in China. So to what extent different control arrangements of family firms lead to higher or lower investment risk? We uses Based on Chinese A-share non-financial listed companies from 2008 to 2017 sample, we found that compared to non-family companies, the founder family’s absolute control of listed companies is not an effective arrangement of control rights. We found out that the higher the degree of family involvement in governance, the higher the stock crash risk. Specifically, the tunneling behavior of the major family shareholders on other minor shareholders has increased stock crash risk. Furtherly, we found that the effect is more pronounced in listed companies with lower levels of Check-and-Balance ownership and lower quality of information disclosure.

关 键 词：家族企业 股价崩盘风险 大股东侵害 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F276.5