基于演化博弈的中小物流企业联盟策略  

Research on Development Strategy of Small and Medium-sized Logistics Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game

作　　者：王可丽 吴桥[2] WANG Ke-li;WU Qiao(Zhejiang Wanli University,Ningbo Zhejiang,315100)

机构地区：[1]浙江万里学院物流与电子商务学院,浙江宁波315100 [2]浙江万里学院,浙江宁波315100

出　　处：《浙江万里学院学报》2021年第2期7-13,共7页Journal of Zhejiang Wanli University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(19BGL046)。

摘　　要：基于演化博弈理论,构建以政府和中小物流企业为主体的演化博弈模型,探讨政府和中小物流企业不同成本收益情况对其策略选择的影响。首先,基于复制动态方程分析双方博弈行为的演化稳定策略;其次,分析相关因素对演化路径的影响;最后,运用数值仿真来验证结论的合理性。研究结果表明:政府搭便车带来的正向收益对政府向激励策略演化具有负作用;中小物流企业搭便车带来的额外收益对政企双方向双赢策略演化具有负作用;政府和企业的额外收益可观,系统就更容易收敛于理想状态。Based on the evolutionary game theory,an evolutionary game model with government and small and medium logistics enterprises as the main body was constructed,and the influence of different cost-benefit situations between the government and small and medium logistics enterprises on their strategic choices was discussed.First,the evolutionary stability strategy of the game behavior of both parties was analyzed based on the replication dynamic equation.Second,the influence of related factors on the evolution path was analyzed.Finally,numerical simulation was used to verify the rationality of the conclusion.The results showed that:the positive benefits from free-riding the government had a negative effect on the evolution of the government’s incentive strategy;the additional benefits brought by the small and medium-sized logistics enterprises’free-riding had a negative effect on the evolution of the win-win strategy between government and enterprises;the additional benefits of the government and enterprises were considerable,the system was easier to converge to the ideal state.

关 键 词：物流企业 演化博弈 政府激励 联盟策略 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]