联合定价下果农对零售商的选择与优化  

Fruit-producer’s strategy of selecting and optimizing retailers under jointpricing

作　　者：凌六一[1] 俞宝 董玉凤 胡中菊[1] LING Liu-yi;YU Bao;DONG Yu-feng;HU Zhong-ju(School of Management,University of Science&Technology of China,Hefei 230026,China;School of Economics and Management,Zhejiang Sci-Tech University,Hangzhou 310018,China)

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,合肥230026 [2]浙江理工大学经济管理学院,杭州310018

出　　处：《控制与决策》2021年第3期747-753,共7页Control and Decision

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71671175,71701186,71631006);教育部人文社科基金项目(17YJCZH039);浙江省自然科学基金项目(LQ17G010004)。

摘　　要：运用斯坦伯格博弈模型,分析联合定价策略下生产两种具有一定替代性水果的果农对下游零售商的选择与优化问题.果农对零售商的选择方案有两种:一是将两种水果同时批发给一个零售商;二是将两种水果分别批发给两个不同的零售商.采用"批发价+利润率"的定价模式分析上述两种情形下果农和零售商的最优决策,并进一步对比得出果农对零售商的最优选择方案.研究结果表明:两种方案下果农的批发价决策不变,但第2种方案下零售商对水果的利润率降低,导致水果的售价降低,从而增加消费者市场的需求,能够进一步促进果农的生产,提高果农的利润.算例分析表明,水果替代性增强时,为了刺激水果的销量,果农将提高两种水果的批发价,从而提高其利润.Using a Stackelberg game model, this paper analyzes the problem of selecting downstream retailers for a fruit-producer who produces two kinds of fruits with partial substitutability under a joint-pricing strategy. There are two schemes for the fruit-producer wholesaling its fruits: one is wholesaling both of the fruits to one retailer, the other is wholesaling them to two different retailers separately. Through analyzing the two schemes under the wholesale-price and profit margin pricing strategy, it is concluded that, the fruit-producer’s decisions of wholesale price remain the same in both schemes, while the retailers reduce their profit margin in the second scenario, which increases the total demand of the retail market and further stimulates the fruit-producer’ investment, leading to an improvement in the fruit-producer’s profit. Numerical results show that as the substitution rate of two fruits increases, the fruit producer will increase its wholesale prices to stimulate consumption, leading to an increase of the profit.

关 键 词：水果供应链 产品替代性 联合定价 利润率 斯坦伯格博弈 农产品 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]