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作 者:张科静[1] 李瑶 ZHANG Kejing;LI Yao(Glorious Sun School of Business and Management,Donghua University,Shanghai 200051,China)
出 处:《东华大学学报(自然科学版)》2021年第1期101-108,共8页Journal of Donghua University(Natural Science)
基 金:教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(12YJA630185)。
摘 要:构建由一家酒店和一个OTA(online travel agency)平台构成的酒店供应链博弈模型,用于分析当OTA做出销售努力,OTA平台的网络外部性对批发价模式以及佣金模式下供应链参与方价格决策的影响,运用Mathematica和逆向归纳法进行模型求解。结果表明:当网络外部性强度在某个阈值内,佣金模式下房间零售价更高;当网络外部性强度在阈值之外,批发价模式下房间零售价更高。A game model of hotel supply chain composed of a hotel and an OTA(online travel agency)platform was built,which was to investigate the effects of OTA s network externality on the optimal price decision of the hotel and the OTA under the wholesale model and commission model,when the OTA made sales efforts.The model was solved by Mathematica and inverse induction.The results show that when the strength of the network externality is within a certain threshold,the room retail price is higher in the commission model;when the strength of the network externality is outside the threshold,the room retail price is higher in the wholesale price model.
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