政府规制下不确定回收量的闭环供应链决策研究  

Decision research on closed-loop supply chain of uncertain recycle quantity under government regulation

作　　者：李芳[1] 陈玲 马鑫 Li Fang;Chen Ling;Ma Xin(Business School,University of Shanghai for Science&Technology,Shanghai 200093,China)

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《计算机应用研究》2021年第4期1128-1132,1144,共6页Application Research of Computers

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71840003);上海市软科学研究重点项目(19692104000)。

摘　　要：针对废旧品回收管理问题,为了实现闭环供应链各主体决策最优、收益最大化的目标,研究构建了回收不确定情况下,政府规制作用下基于第三方回收的新产品和再制品差别定价的闭环供应链决策模型,比较分析了集中和分散两种决策情况下系统决策变量的变化,并通过设计收益共享—费用共担契约机制对分散决策下的供应链进行协调,以达到集中决策的最优目标。通过算例仿真分析对模型进行分析,进一步验证了模型的正确性和有效性,研究表明:回收的不确定性越大,造成成员利润损失的可能性越大,而占据主导地位的成员有优先选取协调因子的权利,为自身谋取更多的利润分成。In view of the problem of waste recycling management,in order to achieve the goal of optimal decision-making and profit maximization of each subject in the closed-loop supply chain,this paper established a closed-loop supply chain decision model based on the differential pricing of new products and remanufactured products based on third party recycling under the uncertainty of recycling and government regulation.It was compared and analyzed the change of system decision variables under the centralized and decentralized decision-making,and used the cost-sharing contract mechanism to coordinate the supply chain to achieve the optimal goal of centralized decision-making.The numerical simulation analysis validated model’s correctness and validity.Research shows:the greater the uncertainty of recovery,the greater the loss of profits,and the dominant members have the right to choose the coordination factor,and seek more profits for themselves.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 政府规制 不确定回收量 利润共享—费用共担契约 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]