国有企业公司治理改革:政治逻辑与经济逻辑的协调融合之道  

Political and Economical Logics and Paths of SOE’s Corporate Governance in the Context of Deepened Reform

作　　者：楼秋然 LOU Qiu-ran(University of International Business and Economics)

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学法学院

出　　处：《华中科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2021年第2期74-83,共10页Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：北京市社会科学基金规划项目“混改背景下北京市属国企公司治理法律问题研究”(20FXC022)。

摘　　要：从顶层设计来看,未来的国有企业改革势必兼具政治与经济逻辑,如何实现政经逻辑的融合协调便至关重要。从两权分离视角下私人公司的过去与最新发展、国企的必然存在价值出发,提升国企治理水平而非对其进行全盘的产权性质改革是更为可取的改革方略。过去的实践虽然试图实现政经融合,却由于治理机制设计不当,加剧了"政企不分"和"内部人控制"。域外国企政企分离的实际运作,不仅提供了通过"不受干预的公司运营"和"不受优待的市场竞争"实现国企效率提升的有益经验,更揭示出"一体适用"的公司治理规则可能为过度政治干预留下的"后门"。应在坚持分类改革的基础上,从"二分的公司治理规则""管理者激励"和"不受优待的市场竞争"三个角度入手,提高国企公司治理水平。According to the top-level design,the future SOE reform must be done with political and economic logics. Thus,the key is to find a way to harmoniously combine the two. From the perspectives of Berle-Means style Private Firms and the value of SOEs,rather than a wholly privatization approach,promoting the level of corporate governance of SOEs is a much better way. Due to ill-designed governance mechanisms,the corporate practice of Chinese SOEs in the past not only deteriorates the problem of the mix of governmental and business functions,but also reveals the problem of insider control as well. The operation of foreign SOEs not only provides that under the principles of Non-Intervention and Non-Preference,the economic efficiency of SOEs would be achieved,but warns that a unified set of corporate governance rules may left a back door for excessive political intervention. The promotion of governance level of Chinese SOEs should be based on classified reform and focus on measures like bipartite governance rules,incentives of managers and non-preference principle.

关 键 词：国有企业 政企不分 二分的公司治理规则 管理者激励 不受优待 

分 类 号：F271.1[经济管理—企业管理] D912.29[经济管理—国民经济]