委托-代理模型与制造业组织结构扁平化设计  

On Flatten Design of Manufacturing Organization Structure and Principal-agent Model

作　　者：杨苗苗 Yang Miaomiao

机构地区：[1]吉林大学珠海学院机械工程学院

出　　处：《珠江论丛》2020年第1期222-233,共12页Pearl River Forum

摘　　要：现有的委托-代理模型的研究基本集中在固定的组织结构上,委托人通过设置激励模型促使代理人努力达到组织目标。现有模型较少考虑组织结构变量对于委托-代理关系的影响。我们认为,应当将组织机构作为一个内生变量,并将委托-代理模型引入组织结构的设计,从委托-代理模型出发去分析组织结构的形式。委托-代理模型结论表明,在激励强度不变的情况下,通过改变组织结构,来协调不同代理人的努力,能够增加组织产出。特别是当多层代理人努力的相关成本很高时,通过组织结构的扁平化设计能够降低成本,提高投资产出效率。本人从委托人和代理人的博弈视角出发,针对制造业的组织结构进行更为合理的初步设计,对相关产业组织结构的设计具有一定的指导意义。The research of the current principal-agent model is mainly focused on the fixed organization structure,and the principal makes the agent strive to achieve the organization goals by setting the incentive model.Therefore,the existing model takes less account of the influence of the organization structure variable on the principal-agent relationship.Therefore,this paper attempts to use the organization structure as an endogenous variable,introduce the principal-agent model into the design of the organization structure,and analyze the form of organization structure from the model of principal agent.The conclusion of the principal-agent model shows that under the condition of unchanged incentive intensity,by changing the organizational structure to coordinate the efforts of different agents,it can increase organizational output.Especially,when the costs associated with the efforts of multi-layer agents are high,the flat design of the organizational structure can reduce costs and improve investment efficiency.From the perspective of the game between the principal and the agent,this article makes a more reasonable preliminary design for the organizational structure of the manufacturing industry which has a certain guiding significance for the design of related industrial organization structures.

关 键 词：组织结构 委托-代理模型 组织产出 制造业 扁平化 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]