考虑追溯水平的食品厂商竞争决策研究  

Production Decisions of Competitive Manufacturers under Traceability System

作　　者：徐若芬 徐畅 范体军[1] XU Ruo-fen;XU Chang;FAN Ti-jun(Business school,East China University of Science and Technology,Shanghai 200237)

机构地区：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2021年第1期116-126,共11页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助重点项目(72032001);国家自然科学基金资助面上项目(71972071);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目。

摘　　要：本文综合考虑食品市场竞争环境,消费者食品安全风险规避程度及食品追溯水平等因素建立了食品厂商的双寡头竞争博弈模型,探讨了食品的追溯水平与消费者风险规避程度对食品厂商价格、安全努力水平以及利润的影响。研究发现:食品厂商的最优价格和食品的安全努力水平随其食品追溯水平的提高而增加,随竞争厂商的食品追溯水平的提高而降低;厂商食品追溯水平较高时,其安全努力水平随消费者风险规避程度的增大而提高,其最优价格随高风险规避型消费者比例的增大而增加;而厂商食品追溯水平较低时,其安全努力水平随消费者风险规避程度的增大先增加而后下降,其最优价格随高风险规避型消费者比例的增大总是下降;随高风险规避型消费者比例的增大,各厂商的食品追溯水平对其决策的影响产生不同的变化。Research source of the problem: Frequent food safety incidents are shocking the world, which become the focus of worldwide attention. Food traceability system has become an effective regulatory to control food safety. Will the effect of traceability systems on food safety change as consumers pay more attention to food safety? How do manufacturers make operational decisions when competition intensifies?Research source of the problem: Frequent food safety incidents have caused serious consequences to people’s health and life safety and aroused the attention of the world. Food traceability system and consumer risk aversion behavior are effective tools to control food safety incidents. However, the traceability and the degree of consumer risk aversion have heterogeneity in different supply chain and market. How traceability and degree of consumer risk aversion affect manufacturers’ safety efforts, prices of foods, and profits in a duopoly market?Description of the problem: Consider two manufacturers located at each end of a Hotelingline and sellinga homogeneous food.Consumers can be divided into two groups: one with high risk aversion and the other with low risk aversion. The risk aversion coefficients of two groups are γ1 and γ2 respectively. Manufacturer i decides his or her own food price pi and safety efforts ei, then delivers foods to consumers. It is defined that food safety incidents will occur with probability of θi=1-ei. Supervisors launch traceability system after incident to punish the responsible manufacturer with traceability Ti, the expected loss of the traceable manufacturer is Ti(1-ei)L.Method model of research: In this paper, a duopoly game model is formulated with consideration of the heterogeneity of consumer risk aversion behavior and traceability system. Then, the Nash equilibrium results of the optimal prices and safety effort for food manufacturers is derived. Furthermore, the impacts of traceability as well as the consumers’ risk aversion on optimal prices and safety effort of food ma

关 键 词：食品安全 追溯水平 竞争 安全努力 风险规避 

分 类 号：F224.9[经济管理—国民经济]