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作 者:赵菊[1,2] 邱菊 侯春波 ZHAO Ju;QIU Ju;HOU Chun-bo(School of Management,Hefei University of Technology,Hefei 230009,China;Key Laboratory of Process Optimization and Intelligent Decision-making,Ministry of Education,Hefei 230601,China)
机构地区:[1]合肥工业大学管理学院,安徽合肥230009 [2]过程优化与智能决策教育部重点实验室,安徽合肥230601
出 处:《中国管理科学》2021年第1期149-157,共9页Chinese Journal of Management Science
基 金:国家社会科学基金资助项目(18BGL265)。
摘 要:随着信息技术的快速发展,以"互联网+"模式为基础的共享单车成为解决城市"最后一公里"问题的最佳选择。本文从公共管理的视角,运用演化博弈的方法,基于共享单车的投放管理,研究了政府部门和共享单车运营商的长期动态演化过程。研究发现,运营商进行共享单车投放量管理时应将社会收益作为衡量指标之一,政府部门积极发挥市场监管职能,引导运营商建立有效的市场规则,同时顺应当前互联网发展的趋势,利用社会化媒体合理有效发挥政府部门的社会监督职能,加快实现政府发挥监管作用、企业单车投放量管理高效化的稳定市场格局。With the rapid development of information technology,bike-sharing,which is based on"Internet+"mode,become a best choice for a city to solve the"last kilometer"problem.However,it has also brought a series of public problems due to excessive volume,such as wasting resources and increasing difficult for city management,etc.Thus,how to manage the number of sharing-bike put into the market is very important for both firms who operate bike-sharing business and relevant government departments.To this end,an evolutionary game model is conducted to study the long-term dynamic evolution process of government departments and bike-sharing operators.Results show that,when performance rewards of regulatory is high,the evolutionary equilibrium strategy is regulatory and rational volume.That is,enlargement of supervision strength and punishment strength is helpful to promote bike-sharing operators putting rational volume of bikes into cities and government departments actively regulating the market of bike-sharing.From the perspective of public management,it is necessary for bike-sharing operators to take the social benefits into account when deciding the supply volume of sharing-bike.And the government departments should actively regulate the market,guiding bike-sharing operators to establish an effective market rule.Then,the evolutionary game model is extended by considering social supervision through social media in which how social media supervision influence the outcome of evolution is discussed.Through analysis of evolution equilibrium strategy,some crucial findings are obtained.Specifically,in addition to increasing performance reward of regulatory and reducing regulatory costs,it is necessary to enlarge the punishment strength for bike-sharing operators who put bikes into market unreasonably and give an effective play to the supervision from social platforms.It increases possibility of realizing a stable market structure with a government that play a role of regulation and bike-sharing operators who can effectively manag
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