Bertrand寡占市场企业交叉持股时定价策略和最优持股的研究  

Pricing Strategy and Optimal Shareholding of Bertrand Duopoly Firms with Cross-shareholding

作　　者：师苑 王新华[1] 高红伟 SHI Yuan;WANG Xin-hua;GAO Hong-wei(College of Economics and Management,Shandong University of Science and Technology,Qingdao 266590,China;Business School,Qingdao University,Qingdao 266071,China;School of Mathematics and Statistics,Qingdao University,Qingdao 266071,China)

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学经济管理学院,山东青岛266590 [2]青岛大学商学院,山东青岛266071 [3]青岛大学数学与统计学院,山东青岛266071

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2021年第2期42-50,共9页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(51574157)。

摘　　要：本文首先研究了公司间交叉持股的利益分配问题,导出了n个公司间交叉持股的利润分配公式。以此为基础,导出了Bertrand寡占市场公司间交叉持股时价格反应函数和均衡价格的一般表达式。通过构建一个两阶段动态博弈,着重研究了Bertrand双寡头市场两厂商交叉持股时的均衡策略问题,给出了厂商间均衡定价与最优持股,分析了均衡策略对厂商经济行为及市场绩效的影响。研究结果表明,可替代品市场的两厂商间交叉持股具有反竞争、促合作的效应。较之非交叉持股,均衡交叉持股提高了均衡价格水平,降低了两厂商各自的产量水平,使各自在较低产量水平下获得较高的利润,从而实现了两厂商间双赢的局面。然而,交叉持股将导致消费者剩余减少,社会经济福利降低。With the increasing popularity of cross-shareholding among firms,the problems of profit distribution after cross-shareholding,how cross-shareholding affects the economic behavior and market performance of firms,and what the optimal shareholding should be have always been hot issues that people pay more attention to.Some literatures have studied the problem of profit distribution of cross-shareholding among firms.However,the profit formulations in literature usually emphasize only one firm’s returns acquired by holding shares of other firms,while neglecting the rival firms’returns demanded by holding the firm’s stock,thus overstating the profit;or only consider the direct shareholding between firms,but ignore the indirect shareholding,resulting in profit omission.Clayton and Jorgensen(2005)analyzed the externality and strategic interactivity when Cournot duopoly market products were substitutes and complements respectively,and put forward the optimal cross-shareholding.They argued that,in an imperfect competitive market,the equilibrium equity of cross-shareholding is positive if the products are complements,the profits of the firms will increase,and the equilibrium equity is negative if the products are substitutes,the profits of the firms will fall.In both cases,consumer surplus will always increase.However,we think their approach and conclusion to be open to question for the substitutes market.First,in general,cross-shareholding equity should be non-negative,the purpose of cross-shareholding is to increase profitability,but their research on substitutes market had an opposite result.Second,their study claimed that cross-shareholding always increase consumer surplus in both substitutes and complements markets,while restrictions and regulations on cross-shareholding always reduce consumer surplus.This conflicts with general perception in substitutes market.In this paper,the benefit distribution of cross-shareholding among n firms is studied,a profit formulation of cross-shareholding is presented which revise

关 键 词：Bertrand寡占市场 交叉持股 收益公式 定价策略 最优持股 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理] F830.9[经济管理—国民经济]