分析师关注度与企业真实盈余管理水平——基于产品市场竞争的调节效应分析  

Analyst Coverage and Enterprise Realistic Earnings Management Level--Based on the Analysis of Moderating Effect of Product Market Competition

作　　者：刘芳 张颖慧[1] LIU Fang;ZHANG Yinghui(School of Economics and Management,Xi'an,Shaanxi,710065,China)

机构地区：[1]西安石油大学经济管理学院,陕西西安710065

出　　处：《西安石油大学学报（社会科学版）》2021年第2期8-16,共9页Journal of Xi’an Shiyou University:Social Science Edition

摘　　要：以2010—2018年沪深两市A股制造业上市公司为研究样本,考察分析师关注和产品市场竞争这两种不同的公司外部治理机制及其相互作用对企业真实盈余管理水平的影响。结果表明:分析师关注度越高,企业真实盈余管理水平就越高;产品市场竞争越激烈,企业真实盈余管理水平也越高。进一步研究发现,激烈的产品市场竞争增强了分析师关注对企业管理层的压力效应。以此为基础对监管机构监督和约束企业管理者提出建议。With A-share listed manufacturing companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen in the period of 2010-2018 as the samples of research,this article analyzes the influence of two different corporate external governance mechanisms and interaction of analyst coverage and product market competition on enterprise earnings management.The results show that the higher the level of analyst coverage is,the higher the level of enterprise realistic earnings managementis;the more fierce the competition is,the higher the enterprise earnings management is.And it is further found out that fierce product market competition intensifies the pressure effect of analyst coverage on enterprise management layer.Based on the study,some suggestions are offered to the supervision of regulators,and the restriction of managers.

关 键 词：分析师关注 产品市场竞争 真实盈余管理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]