公司治理、盈余操纵和CEO异常变更  

Corporate Governance,Earnings Manipulation and Abnormal CEO Change

作　　者：况学文[1] 吴凡 KUANG Xue-wen;WU Fan(School of Economics and Management,Nanchang University,Nanchang 330031,China)

机构地区：[1]南昌大学经济管理学院,江西南昌330031

出　　处：《南昌大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2021年第2期55-66,共12页Journal of Nanchang University(Humanities and Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“高管团队自下而上的内部治理研究:乙狼能有效监督头狼吗?”(71962018)。

摘　　要：CEO进行自利性的盈余操纵,会增加公司特质性风险,损害公司内外各相关方的利益,引起各方对盈余操纵的惩治,进而导致CEO的异常变更。实证研究结果发现,在控制内生性干扰后,盈余操纵会导致更高概率的CEO异常变更,且高质量公司治理对盈余操纵与CEO异常变更具有显著的正向调节作用。研究结果表明,良好的公司治理会对CEO的盈余操纵行为进行惩治,进而导致CEO的异常变更。进一步分析发现,盈余操纵与CEO异常变更的关系在内部治理质量较高的企业中表现得更为显著。The CEO’s self-interested earnings manipulation will increase the company’s idiosyncratic risks,damage the interests of all parties inside and outside the company,cause all parties to punish the earnings manipulation,and lead to abnormal changes in the CEO.The empirical study found that after controlling for endogenous interference,earnings manipulation will lead to higher probability of abnormal CEO changes,and high-quality corporate governance has a significant positive regulatory effect on earnings manipulation and CEO abnormal changes.The research results show that good corporate governance will punish the CEO’s earnings manipulation behavior,which in turn leads to abnormal changes in the CEO.Further analysis found that the relationship between earnings manipulation and abnormal CEO changes is more prominent in companies with higher internal governance quality.

关 键 词：盈余操纵 内部治理 高管变更 

分 类 号：F275.2[经济管理—企业管理] F272.3[经济管理—国民经济]