竞合视角下高技术企业创新联盟稳定性研究  

Research on the Stability of High-tech Enterprise Innovation Alliance from the Perspective of Coopetition

作　　者：孙凯 郭稳 SUN Kai;GUO Wen(School of Business Administration,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou 310018,China;School of Economics and Management,Harbin University of Science and Technology,Harbin 150040,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江财经大学工商管理学院,浙江杭州310018 [2]哈尔滨理工大学经济与管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150080

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2021年第3期219-229,共11页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72072156,71472109);黑龙江省留学归国人员科学基金资助项目(LC2012C16);黑龙江省高校青年学术骨干支持计划项目(1254G022)。

摘　　要：从竞合的理论视角出发,运用演化博弈理论,通过构建高技术企业创新联盟成员企业竞合关系的演化博弈模型,分析信任度、互补度、风险系数以及合作创新贴现因子等因素对创新联盟稳定性的影响,并运用Matlab对上述因素的影响进行了数值仿真。结果表明,较高的信任度和互补度可以提高联盟成员间的合作意愿,保障联盟的稳定运行;较高的合作创新贴现因子通过降低联盟成员未来收益的不确定性,增强了合作伙伴间进行长期合作的信心,维持了联盟的稳定运行;由于较高的风险系数增加了合作创新的风险成本,导致联盟成员间合作关系可能演变为竞争关系,从而阻碍了联盟的稳定发展。最后,根据演化博弈分析结果提出了相关建议。In the environment of frequent technical iterations and rapid economic development,the innovation needs and risks of high-tech enterprise innovation alliance members are gradually increasing,and innovation based on competition and cooperation becomes their only way.Pure competition or cooperation is emphasized by most of the previous studies,but as the new market environment changes,its drawbacks continue to emerge,and the coopetition strategy come into being.Therefore,based on the duality of competition and cooperation demonstrated by the innovation behavior of members of China’s high-tech enterprise alliance,this paper aims at the coopetition relationship between members in the high-tech enterprise innovation alliance.From the theoretical perspective of coopetition,the factors affecting the coopetition relationship among the members of the alliance is analyzed.The evolutionary game theory is used to construct the evolutionary game model of the high-tech enterprise innovation alliance member A and B co-opetition relationship.By solving the replication dynamic equations of the ratio of the cooperation strategy between the both sides of the game,the evolutionary path of alliance members’coopetition relationship in the two cases when the synergistic benefit is not enough to make up for the risk cost and when the synergistic benefit is enough to make up for the risk cost are analyzed.And then,the strategic choices of alliance members under the influence of factors such as trust,complementarity,risk factors,and cooperative innovation discount factors are analyzed.Finally,Matlab is used to verify the above factors by numerical simulation.The result reveals that the improvement of the level of collaborative innovation trust makes the opportunistic behavior and vicious competition among the members of the alliance are effectively suppressed,and the stability of the alliance is guaranteed.In addition,the increasing complementarity among members of the alliance helps to establish a close relationship is between member

关 键 词：创新联盟 竞合 演化博弈 联盟稳定性 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]