检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
作 者:曹庆奎 袁雯慧 史红伟 任向阳 CAO Qingkui;YUAN Wenhui;SHI Hongwei;REN Xiangyang(School of Management Engineering and Business,Hebei University of Engineering,Handan,Hebei 056038,China;Faculty of Economics and Management,Langfang Normal University,Langfang,Hebei 065000,China;China Water Investment Co.,Ltd.,Beijing 100053,China)
机构地区:[1]河北工程大学管理工程与商学院,河北邯郸056038 [2]廊坊师范学院经济与管理学院,河北廊坊065000 [3]中国水务投资有限公司,北京100053
出 处:《河北工程大学学报(自然科学版)》2021年第1期105-112,共8页Journal of Hebei University of Engineering:Natural Science Edition
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(61375003)。
摘 要:基于废旧电器电子产品(Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment,WEEE)特性,考虑了市场需求的不确定性,将需求模糊化处理,建立零售商主导下政府分别对制造商、零售商、第三方回收商实行奖惩政策的闭环供应链(Closed-Loop Supply Chain,CLSC)回收定价模型,运用博弈理论得出三种回收定价模型中各决策变量基于政府奖惩力度的变化。结果表明制造商回收模式下商品的批发价最低、废旧品回收率最高,制造商的收益远远大于零售商的收益,这为制造型企业的供应链管理提供了合理的建议。Based on the product characteristics of waste electrical and electronic equipment(WEEE),considering the uncertainty of market demand,the demand is fuzzed,and a closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)is established under the guidance of retailers,in which the government implements reward and punishment policies for manufacturers,retailers and third-party recyclers respectively,and with the use of game theory,decision variables change based on government’s rewards and punishments in the three recycling pricing models.The results show that the wholesale price of goods is the lowest and the recycling rate of waste products is the highest under the manufacturer recycling mode,and the manufacturer's revenue is far greater than the retailer's revenue,which provides reasonable suggestions for the supply chain management of manufacturing enterprises.
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.13