不同契约下考虑公平偏好的供应商创新投入研究  

A Research on the Supplier's Innovation Investment Considering Fairness Preference under Different Contracts

作　　者：邵必林[1] 王丽君 SHAO Bilin;WANG Lijun(School of Management,Xi'an University of Architecture and Technology,Xi'an 710055,China)

机构地区：[1]西安建筑科技大学管理学院,陕西西安710055

出　　处：《工业工程》2021年第2期85-91,124,共8页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：陕西省自然科学基金资助项目(2019JM-521)。

摘　　要：针对一个供应商和一个制造商组成的供应链,研究供应商公平偏好对其创新投入的影响。引入公平偏好理论,运用Stackelberg博弈,建立批发价格契约、研发成本分担契约和收益共享契约3种契约下的供应链决策模型,对比分析不同契约下公平偏好系数对供应链均衡信息的影响。研究表明,研发成本分担契约下的供应商创新水平、供应链中成员效用及供应链整体效用总高于其他2种契约;收益共享契约下的供应商创新水平和供应链整体效用高于批发价格契约;批发价格契约和收益共享契约下的制造商效用和供应商效用的大小与供应商公平偏好系数以及收益共享契约下的供应商保留效用的大小有关。Considering a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a manufacturer,the theory of fairness preference,the effects of supplier's fairness preference on his innovation investment is explored.By establishing a supply chain decision model with Stackelberg games under wholesale price contract,research cost sharing contract and revenue sharing contract,the effects of fairness preference coefficient on supply chain equilibrium strategy under different contracts are compared and analyzed.The results show that the level of supplier innovation and supply chain's utility under research cost-sharing contract are always higher than other contracts.The level of supplier innovation and the supply chain overall utility under revenue sharing contract is higher than that of wholesale price contract.The utility of manufacturer and the supplier under wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract is related to the fair preference coefficient of the supplier and the supplier retained utility under revenue sharing contract.

关 键 词：公平偏好 供应链契约 供应商创新投入 供应链效用 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]