非控股大股东退出威胁与创新投资——基于产品市场竞争程度与财富集中度的研究  

Non-controlling Large Shareholders.Exit Threats and Enterprises.Innovation:An Empirical Study Based on Competitive Intensity and Concentration of Wealth

作　　者：王爱群[1] 刘耀娜 WANG Aiqun;LIU Yaona(School of Management,Jilin University,Changchun 130022,China)

机构地区：[1]吉林大学管理学院,吉林长春130022

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2021年第5期47-60,共14页East China Economic Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目“内部控制缺陷披露、利益相关者感知与经济后果研究”(13YJA630085)。

摘　　要：文章以2009—2019年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,研究了非控股大股东退出威胁对企业创新投资的影响及其作用机制。研究发现,非控股大股东的退出威胁促进了企业的创新投资,当企业产品市场竞争程度越低,管理层和控股股东财富集中度越大时,非控股大股东退出威胁对创新投资促进作用越明显。进一步研究表明,非控股大股东退出威胁通过抑制管理层私利及控股股东掏空行为、提高信息透明度和缓解融资约束促进企业创新投资。研究结论证实了非控股大股东退出威胁会对企业创新产生积极影响,为非控股大股东参与公司治理、完善公司治理机制和促进企业创新提供了一定的参考依据。Taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2009 to 2019 as samples,this paper studies the impact of the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders on enterprises’innovation investment and its mechanism.It is found that the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders promotes the innovation investment of enterprises.When the degree of product market competition is lower and the wealth concentration of management and controlling shareholders is higher,the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders promotes the innovation investment more obviously.Further research shows that the exit threat of non-controlling large shareholders can promote enterprise innovation investment by restraining the private interests of management and tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders,improving information transparency,and easing financing constraints.The conclusion confirms that the withdrawal threat of non-controlling large shareholders will have a positive impact on enterprise innovation,which provides a certain reference for non-controlling large shareholders to participate in corporate governance,improve corporate governance mechanism,and promote enterprise innovation.

关 键 词：非控股大股东 退出威胁 创新投资 代理成本 掏空行为 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理] F275.6[经济管理—国民经济]