上市公司股权激励、大股东制衡与并购溢价  

Equity Incentive,Major Shareholder Balance and Merger premium of Listed Companies

作　　者：谭庆 吴铖铖 项桂娥 Tan Qing;Wu Chengcheng;Xiang Guie(Business College,Chizhou University,Chizhou Anhui 247000)

机构地区：[1]池州学院商学院,安徽池州247000

出　　处：《郑州航空工业管理学院学报》2021年第2期53-65,共13页Journal of Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics

基　　金：安徽省社会科学创新发展研究课题重大研究项目(2019ZD005);高校优秀青年骨干人才国外访问研修项目(gxgwfx2019063);池州学院人文社会科学研究一般项目(CZ2019RW06)。

摘　　要：并购重组已成为企业发挥优化资源配置、价值发现等功能的重要手段。以2008年至2018年上市公司重大资产重组事件作为研究对象,实证分析股权激励能否提高并购溢价。研究发现:(1)存在股权激励时,公司并购所支付的并购溢价显著更高。(2)股权激励对并购溢价的显著加强作用主要存在于大股东制衡较低的情况下,大股东制衡较高的情况下不存在显著影响。(3)股权激励下采用期权激励方式较其他方式的并购溢价更高,行权指标个数对并购溢价有显著的抑制作用,行权有效期可以显著抑制并购溢价。M&a has become an important means for enterprises to optimize resource allocation and value discovery.This paper takes the material assets reorganization events of listed companies from 2008 to 2016 as the research object and empirically analyzes whether equity incentive can improve m&a premium.The study found that:(1)when equity incentive exists,the m&a premium paid by the company is significantly higher.(2)the significant strengthening effect of equity incentive on m&a premium mainly exists in the case of low checks and balances of major shareholders,while there is no significant influence in the case of high checks and balances of major shareholders.(3)in the case of equity incentive,the m&a premium is higher in the case of option incentive than in the case of other options.The number of exercise indexes has a significant inhibitory effect on the m&a premium,and the period of exercise period can significantly inhibit the m&a premium.

关 键 词：并购溢价 股权激励 大股东制衡 上市公司 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]