机构持股与公司行为:迎合还是改进?——基于公司盈余管理的经验证据  

Institutional Shareholding and Corporate Behavior:Pandering or Improving?Evidence Based on Company Earnings Management

作　　者：薛坤坤[1] 王凯[2] XUE Kunkun;WANG Kai(Business School/Postdoctoral Research Station of Public Administration,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China;College of Business Administration,Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing 100070,China)

机构地区：[1]郑州大学商学院/公共管理博士后科研流动站,河南郑州450001 [2]首都经济贸易大学工商管理学院,北京100070

出　　处：《中南财经政法大学学报》2021年第3期15-25,158,共12页Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目“董事会权力结构、决策类型与企业投资效率研究”(72002205);国家自然科学基金青年项目“创始人资源禀赋与反收购条款设立的双向影响研究:理论与应用”(71702114);郑州大学人文社会科学优秀青年科研团队项目“国有企业混合所有制改革的微观治理机制及其优化研究”(2020-QNTD-01)。

摘　　要：基于迎合理论和代理理论,本文研究了机构投资者持股对公司盈余管理的影响,并利用2006~2018年沪深两市上市公司的数据进行实证分析。研究发现,机构投资者持股与公司盈余管理呈倒U型关系,较低的机构投资者持股会增加公司盈余管理行为,当机构投资者持股达到一定比例后,机构投资者持股增加会降低公司盈余管理行为。在将上市公司按照上期业绩好坏、机构投资者类型以及企业所有权性质进行划分之后发现,机构投资者持股与盈余管理之间的倒U型关系在不同样本中存在差异,在上期业绩较差、存在稳定型机构投资者以及国有企业样本中,机构投资者持股与盈余管理之间的倒U型关系更加明显。Based on catering theory and agency theory,this paper studies the influence of institutional investors'shareholding on corporate earnings management,and uses the data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2006 to 2018 for empirical analysis.The research shows that institutional investors'shareholdings and corporate earnings management are inverted U-shaped,while lower institutional investors'shareholdings will increase earnings management behavior,then with the increase of institutional investors'shareholdings,corporate earnings management behavior will be reduced.Further research finds that the inverted U-shaped relationship between institutional investors'shareholding and earnings management behavior is different in different samples after the listed companies are divided according to the past performance,the type of institutional investors and the nature of corporate ownership.In the previous period,the performance was worse,and the inverted U-shaped relationship between institutional investors and the earnings management behavior was more significant in the stable institutional investors and the sample of state-owned enterprises.

关 键 词：机构投资者 公司行为 盈余管理 迎合理论 代理理论 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]