权利理论:民法视角下的解释选择  

Right Theory: Choices of Interpretation in the Perspective of Civil Law

作　　者：沈健州 SHEN Jianzhou(Law School,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,China)

机构地区：[1]清华大学法学院,北京100084

出　　处：《上海大学学报（社会科学版）》2021年第3期43-59,共17页Journal of Shanghai University(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(18ZDA149)。

摘　　要：利益理论和意志理论关于权利本质的分歧由来已久。既有的讨论存在两种不同语境:在第一重语境下,讨论者力图回答“如何从现实世界中识别和确认权利”;在第二重语境下,讨论主要围绕“对已被识别和确认的权利应当如何解释”展开。对第一重语境下的“权利本质”问题,权利的程序理论尝试通过范式转换以跳出窠臼,这为第二重语境下的权利本质问题带来启示——对权利的解释不应脱离实定法。在实定法的视域下,利益理论和意志理论对权利本质的争论,很大程度上是不同讨论者关于选择何种路径对权利加以理解、描述和表达的解释分歧,而非事实判断或价值判断之争。通过现有民事权利规则对两者加以考察发现,利益理论可以较为完满地回应既有的经典诘难,而意志理论的解释力则颇显捉襟见肘。引入现行实定法非但不会终结对权利理论的讨论,相反,这将有助于促进权利理论的中国叙事,以及法哲学与部门法学之间的有益交流。The Interest Theory and the Will Theory have long been in disagreement on the nature of rights.The existing discussions proceed in two different contexts:how to identify and confirm the rights from the real world,and how to interpret the rights that have already been identified and confirmed.Regarding the first issue,the Procedural Theory of Rights attempts to break through the limitations through paradigm shifts,which brings inspiration to the second issue that the interpretation of rights should not deviate from the positive law.From the perspective of positive law,the divergence between the Interest Theory and the Will Theory on the nature of rights is largely about how to understand,describe,and express rights,rather than a dispute over fact determination or value judgment.Examining the two theories through the existing rules of civil rights,it is found that the Interest Theory can respond more completely to classic challenges,while the explanatory power of the Will Theory is quite limited.The introduction of positive law will not end the discussion of Right Theory,but rather,it will contribute to the development of Right Theory in China and promote exchanges between legal philosophy and departmental law.

关 键 词：权利理论 利益理论 意志理论 民事权利 解释选择 

分 类 号：DF51[政治法律—民商法学]