存在免费版的信息产品质量选择及政府反盗版监管策略研究  

Research on the quality selection of information products and the government anti-piracy supervision strategy with free version

作　　者：高鹏 朱宾欣[2,3] 陆玉梅 GAO Peng;ZHU Binxin;LU Yumei(School of Business,Jiangsu University of Technology,Changzhou 213001,China;School of Management,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China;Centre for Competitive Creative Design,Cranfield University,Bedfordshire MK430AL,UK)

机构地区：[1]江苏理工学院商学院,江苏常州213001 [2]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013 [3]克兰菲尔德大学竞争创新设计中心,贝德福德郡 MK430AL 英国

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2021年第3期130-140,共11页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71673118、71672153);江苏省社会科学基金项目(20GLD007)。

摘　　要：运用博弈论研究了免费版产品的推出对信息产品提供商定价质量决策以及政府反盗版监管策略的影响。通过消费者效用分析给出了正版、盗版及免费版产品的市场需求函数,探讨了消费者免费版偏好以及政府盗版监管力度对各类产品均衡价格、质量、提供商利润的影响,进一步对比分析了无监管、完全保护以及均衡监管三种策略下的社会总福利以及产品质量差异。研究表明:免费版的推出会降低信息产品质量,损失提供商利润;盗版产品价格和需求随免费版偏好的增大先下降后上升;只要不是盗版偏好很大,免费版偏好能显著降低政府均衡盗版监管力度,减轻盗版监管压力;盗版偏好较低时,社会福利随免费版偏好而上升,政府选择无监管策略;盗版偏好较高时,社会福利随免费版偏好而下降,政府选择均衡监管或无监管策略;政府的盗版监管策略的选择与信息产品质量最大化存在矛盾性。The low marginal cost and the ease of reproduction of information products have caused serious piracy problems,which have seriously affected the economic benefits of providers and government revenue.In addition to the government′s efforts to increase antipiracy supervision,launching free version of information products is also an important means for providers to curb piracy.Due to the existence of network externalities,the free version strategy will significantly affect consumer choice behavior and will also have a certain“bumping down”effect on pirated and legal products.It not only affects the product quality decisions of providers,but also brings uncertainty to the government′s choice of anti-piracy supervision strategies.There is a lot of literature about government anti-piracy supervision and provider′s free version strategies,but little has noticed the interaction between them.This paper is based on the research framework of a four-party game consisted of consumers,information product providers,pirate dealer,and the government,by comprehensively using research methods including game theory,decision optimization theory,mathematical analysis,and computer simulation.It explores how the quality of information products and government′s supervision change after the provider launches the free version information products.Firstly,the paper describes pricing and quality decisions without piracy in the market.Secondly,by assuming that consumers′free version preferences are lower than piracy preferences,and the government′s anti-piracy supervision is an exogenous variable,a pricing and quality game model is constructed and solved when there are both free versions and pirated products in the market.The effects of consumer′s free preferences and the government supervision on product equilibrium prices,demand,and product quality choices are analyzed.Thirdly,based on the objective function of total social welfare,this paper analyses how the balanced supervision intensity,product equilibrium quality,and t

关 键 词：免费版 信息产品质量决策 政府盗版监管 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F270.5[经济管理—企业管理]