双重行为偏好下供应商主导型供应链决策与协调研究  

Decision-making and coordination of supplier-led supply chain with dual-preference

作　　者：李亚东[1] 鲜春兰 官振中[1] LI Yadong;XIAN Chunlan;GUAN Zhenzhong(School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2021年第3期181-194,共14页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71572154)。

摘　　要：有关供应链决策者公平关切的研究日益增多,不利的不公平极易产生效用损失,而有利的不公平则更易被人接受,公平关切行为下隐藏着对损失的厌恶。本文在考虑显性公平关切与隐性损失厌恶双重行为偏好的基础上构建了一个由供应商主导的二级供应链协调模型。研究发现,在随机线性需求和随机非线性需求环境下,双重行为偏好下供应链的协调都需要满足特定条件。在随机线性需求下供应商实现供应链协调的决策空间较窄,而非线性随机需求下须满足的条件更为简单,为供应商提供了较大的决策空间。在不同的需求环境下,零售商的决策行为特征具有很高的相似性,而对应的效用特征则截然不同,市场需求环境的差异会导致双重行为偏好零售商效用的增加或受损。在制定契约的过程中充分考虑决策者行为偏好的复杂性,把握行为偏好的实质,就可以通过简单的契约来消除双重边际化效应,提高供应链的整体收益水平,使供应链达到协调。There are more and more researches on the fairness concern of supply chain decision-makers.The disadvantageous inequality is easy to produce utility loss,while the advantageous inequality is more acceptable.The behavior of fairness concern hides the aversion to loss.Previous studies often only consider the influence of single preference on decision-making behavior,which can not fully reflect the complexity of decision-makers′behavior.The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of the decision-maker′s dualpreference on his/her behavior,so as to preliminarily reflect the complex behavior of supply chain decision-makers.In this paper,considering the dual-preference of explicit fairness concern and implicit loss aversion,a supplier led-two-level supply chain coordination model is constructed.The results show that the coordination characteristics of each preference type of supply chain are similar under different demand situations.The rational supply chain decision-making model can not achieve coordination through a single wholesale price contract in two demand scenarios.The supply chain model with single fair preference and dual-preference can achieve coordination only when specifit conditions are met in both demand scenarios.The supply chain model with single loss aversion preference can be coordinated unconditionally in both demand scenarios.The conditions of the coordination of the dual-preference channel under nonlinear stochastic demand are more simple,and the conditions to achieve coordination in the two demand scenarios only limit the scope of the advantageous situations.In all types of the supply chain models,retailers have similar decision behavior characteristics in different demand scenarios.Under disadvantageous condition,the optimal pricings of retailers with behavioral preferences are higher than that of rational retailers,and the pricing of dual-preference retailers are higher than that of fair preference retailers,and are higher than that of loss averse retailers in a specific range.Under adv

关 键 词：双重行为偏好 显隐性偏好 渠道协调 批发价格契约 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]