胡塞尔的笛卡尔哲学批判  

Husserl’s Critique of Descartes’Philosophy

作　　者：李云飞 LI Yunfei

机构地区：[1]广东外语外贸大学马克思主义学院,广东广州510420

出　　处：《上海师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2021年第3期25-34,共10页Journal of Shanghai Normal University(Philosophy & Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：2012年度国家社科基金重大招标项目(12&ZD124);2016年度国家社科基金一般项目(16BZX066);2018年度广东省哲学社会科学“十三五”规划一般项目(GD18CZX02);2018年度广东外语外贸大学引进人才科研启动项目(299-X5218105)。

摘　　要：胡塞尔的笛卡尔哲学批判遵循历史—目的论的原则。他以现象学的眼光考量笛卡尔的主体性转向,展显其哲学的隐蔽的两义性。据此,胡塞尔认为,笛卡尔既是客观主义的理性主义之近代观念的原创者,又是冲破这种观念的先验动机的原创者,这构成笛卡尔哲学的内在张力。从这种内在张力出发,胡塞尔的批判聚焦笛卡尔哲学的不彻底性,旨在还原他的先验动机的本来面目,借此对笛卡尔哲学实行现象学的改造。事实上,先验现象学与客观主义哲学之间截然对立,笛卡尔的客观主义哲学有其自身的内在理路。因此,这是一种错位的批判。但是,借助这种错位的批判,胡塞尔不仅深化了哲学的自身理解,而且澄清了其先验现象学的历史必然性。Husserl’s critique of Cartesian philosophy follows the historical-teleological principle.He considered Descartes’subjectivity turn from the perspective of phenomenology and elucidated the hidden ambiguity of Cartesian philosophy.Husserl be⁃lieved that Descartes was both the originator of the modern concept of objective rationalism and the originator of the transcendental motives that broke through this concept,which constituted the inherent tension of Cartesian philosophy.Starting from this inter⁃nal tension,Husserl’s critique focused on the incompleteness of Cartesian philosophy,aimed at restoring the true nature of his transcendental motives,thereby implementing phenomenological transformation of Cartesian philosophy.In fact,the transcen⁃dental phenomenology and the objectivist philosophy are diametrically opposed,and Cartesian objectivistic philosophy has its own internal mechanism.Therefore,this is a misplaced critique.However,with this misplaced critique,Husserl not only deepened his own understanding of philosophy,but also clarified the historical necessity of his transcendental phenomenology.

关 键 词：胡塞尔 现象学 笛卡尔哲学 先验动机 客观主义的理性主义 

分 类 号：B5[哲学宗教—外国哲学]