有追索权保理融资下零售商主导型供应链协调研究  

Research on Retailer-dominated Supply Chain Coordination Based on Recourse Factoring

作　　者：董青 何娟[1] 陈家慧 陈传容 DONG Qing;HE Juan;CHEN Jia-hui;CHEN Chuan-rong(School of Transportation and Logistics,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 611756,China)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学交通运输与物流学院,成都611756

出　　处：《交通运输工程与信息学报》2021年第2期53-64,共12页Journal of Transportation Engineering and Information

基　　金：国家自然基金项目(71273214/G0302,71873111);教育部人文社科规划基金(18YJAZH024)。

摘　　要：为了盘活供应链上应收账款,缓解中小供应商的资金约束,降低供应链中断风险,本文以单供应商和单零售商组成的二级零售商主导型供应链为研究背景,建立Stackelberg博弈模型探讨有追索权保理融资模式下的零售商主导型供应链运营决策和协调问题。研究表明,在零售商主导型供应链中,有追索权保理融资能够有效缓解中小供应商面临的资金约束问题,但无法达到供应链集中决策时的收益和最优产量,而引入收益共享契约和风险分担契约可以协调供应链,达到集中决策时的最优生产量,实现供应链成员间的收益分配。In order to invigorate the accounts receivable in the supply chain,alleviate the capital constraint of small and medium-sized suppliers,and reduce the risk of supply chain interruption,this paper was based on a secondary retailer-dominated supply chain consisting of a single supplier and a single retailer.A Stackelberg game model was established to discuss the operation decision and coordination of retailer-dominated supply chain under recourse factoring financing mode.This study shows that in retailer-dominated supply chain,recourse factoring financing can effectively alleviate the financial constraints faced by small and medium-sized suppliers.However,the revenue and optimal output cannot be achieved when the supply chain is centralized,and the introduction of revenue sharing contract and risk sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain,achieve the optimal yield when the centralized decision is made,and realize the income distribution among the supply chain members.

关 键 词：供应链协调 保理融资业务 STACKELBERG博弈 零售商主导型供应链 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]