胡塞尔没有质料伦理学吗?——连贯理解胡塞尔前后期伦理学的一种尝试  

Is there no material ethics in Husserl's phenomenology:An attempt to coherently comprehending Husserl's early and later ethics

作　　者：徐立文[1] Xu Liwen(Department of Philosophy,Sun Yat-Sen University,Guangzhou 510275)

机构地区：[1]中山大学哲学系

出　　处：《哲学评论》2015年第2期90-104,共15页Wuda Philosophical Review

摘　　要：文章从布伦塔诺的《论道德认识的起源》谈起,分析了胡塞尔前期的伦理学思想及其与布伦塔诺伦理学的关系,并且在此背景下关注胡塞尔前后期伦理学的异同。论文的基本观点是,胡塞尔后期伦理学的变化并不像通常所说的那样,是受费希特的影响而产生出来的,而是胡塞尔伦理学本身内在困境的产物,即发展出一门质料伦理学的困境。据此,论文将胡塞尔的后期伦理学看作是宽泛意义上的质料伦理学的一部分。This article begins from Brentano's The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong,then analysis Husserl's early ethics and its relation to Brentano's ethics.In this context,the article focuses on the difference between Husserl's early and later ethics.The basic viewpoint is that the turn of Husserl's later ethics is not as usually says influenced by Fichte,but the result of inner difficulty of developing a material ethics.According to these points,the author sees Husserl's later ethics as a part of material ethics in broad sense.

关 键 词：非客体化行为 形式伦理学 质料伦理学 胡塞尔 

分 类 号：B51[哲学宗教—外国哲学]