康德论本体论证明  

Kant on the Ontological Argument

作　　者：伊恩·普卢普斯 彭志君(译) IAN PROOPS;Peng Zhijun(The University of Texas at Austin;Hunan Women’s University)

机构地区：[1]得克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校 [2]湖南大学马克思主义学院 [3]长沙师范学院马克思主义学院

出　　处：《哲学评论》2020年第2期80-113,共34页Wuda Philosophical Review

基　　金：国家社科基金后期资助项目(18FZX042)。

摘　　要：本文审视了康德在《纯粹理性批判》中对广义的笛卡儿式本体论证明的各种批评。本文认为,每一种批评对其预期目标都是有效的,这些目标——除笛卡儿本人外——还包括莱布尼茨、沃尔夫和鲍姆加登。本文认为,康德最著名的批评——对存在不是实在的谓词的指责——是专门针对莱布尼茨的。康德针对这个主题的论证——从他的100塔勒的例子中进行的论证——尽管好像是令人质疑的,但实际上它成功地反驳了莱布尼茨。之所以如此是因为,如果人们确定了莱布尼茨的假设的话,这个令人质疑的指控是可以被反驳的。The article examines Kant’s various criticisms of the broadly Cartesian ontological argument as they are developed in the Critique of Pure Reason.It is argued that each of these criticisms is effective against its intended target,and that these targets include-in addition to Descartes himself-Leibniz,Wolff,and Baumgarten.It is argued that Kant’s most famous criticism-the charge that being is not a real predicate-is directed exclusively against Leibniz.Kant’s argument for this thesis-the argument proceeding from his example of a hundred thalers-although it may seem to beg the question,in fact succeeds against Leibniz.It does so because the charge of begging the question can be rebutted if one makes certain Leibnizian assumptions.

关 键 词：康德 本体论证明 存在 实在的谓词 实存 

分 类 号：B516.31[哲学宗教—外国哲学]