基于风险偏好的委托代理博弈均衡分析  

Equilibrium Analysis of Principal-agent Game Based on Risk Preference

作　　者：徐剑 XU Jian(CLP Microelectronics Technology Co.,Ltd.,Hefei 230088,China)

机构地区：[1]中电博微电子科技有限公司,合肥230088

出　　处：《价值工程》2021年第13期49-50,共2页Value Engineering

摘　　要：根据企业所有者与企业经营者之间的委托代理关系特点,在假设条件下构建基于双方风险偏好的博弈模型,以此模型通过均衡分析定性探讨企业收入和激励成效的影响因素,尤其是企业经营者和企业所有者风险偏好对企业收入和激励成效的影响。According to the characteristics of the principal-agent relationship between business owners and business operators,a game model based on the risk preferences of both parties is constructed under assumptions.This model uses equilibrium analysis to qualitatively explore the influencing factors of corporate income and incentive effectiveness,especially the impact of the risk preference of business operators and business owners on corporate income and incentive effectiveness.

关 键 词：风险偏好 委托代理 博弈 均衡分析 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]