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作 者:王雅娟 周先舫 王先甲[3] 邓旭东[1,2] WANG Ya-juan;ZHOU Xian-fang;WANG Xian-jia;DENG Xu-dong(Evergrande School of Management,Wuhan University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430081,China;Center for Service Science and Engineering,Wuhan University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430081,China;Economics and Management School,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)
机构地区:[1]武汉科技大学恒大管理学院,湖北武汉430081 [2]武汉科技大学服务科学与工程研究中心,湖北武汉430081 [3]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072
出 处:《长江流域资源与环境》2021年第4期818-826,共9页Resources and Environment in the Yangtze Basin
基 金:国家自然科学基金项目(71601150;71871171);湖北省高等学校哲学社会科学研究重大项目(20ZD023)。
摘 要:为探索不同种类水污染物排污权的在线初始分配方法,根据不同水污染物的特性,基于水环境容量价值,描述了一种可随时对多种水污染物排污权进行不同数量报价的投标语言。针对每家企业关于多种排污权组合的需求,构建了在线拍卖机制设计模型,提出了赢家判决流程和支付计算流程,获得了在线拍卖机制。该机制可在完全未知将来投标序列的情况下,立即对当前投标做出是否分配某种排污权组合的决策,并在企业离开前做出支付决策。理论分析表明,所提出机制可吸引更多的企业自愿参与,激励企业报告真实的到达时间、单位水环境容量估值及离开时间。相比于完全信息下的有效分配,该机制在社会福利、企业成交率和排污权利用率等方面能取得良好的效果。该文机制有助于制定公平、有效的异质水污染物排污权的初始分配方案。The purpose of the study is to explore the online initial allocation of various water pollutant emission permits. According to the characteristics of various water pollutants, the specified bidding language is designed base on the value of water environmental capacity. The bidding language can provide an accurate quotation for multiple units of different water pollutant emissions over time. Aimed at each enterprise needs for various combinations of emission permit, the mechanism design model for online auctions is developed. On the basis of the model, the winner determination process and payment calculation process are designed. Thus, the auction mechanism is generated. The mechanism makes allocation decision immediately as each bid is revealed online and without the knowledge of enterprises who will subsequently arrive. The allocation decision determines whether a certain combination is allocated for the enterprise. The mechanism makes payment decision before the enterprise leaves. The theoretical analysis shows that the mechanism not only can attract more enterprises to volunteer for the auction, but also can incentive each enterprise to declare his truthful arrival time, unit value of water environmental capacity and depart time. Compared with the effective allocation under complete information, the mechanism achieves good results in many aspects such as social welfare, transaction rate of enterprises and utilization rate of emission permits. The mechanism helps to make the fair and efficient initial allocation plan of water pollutant emission permits.
关 键 词:异质水污染物 排污权 初始分配 在线拍卖 机制设计
分 类 号:X196[环境科学与工程—环境科学]
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